Ἀθηναῖος: ταῦτα μὲν οὖν δὴ ταύτῃ: πολιτείας δὲ ποτὲ φῶμεν γεγονέναι; μῶν οὐκ ἐνθένδε τις ἂν αὐτὴν ῥᾷστά τε καὶ κάλλιστα κατίδοι;
Κλεινίας: πόθεν;
Ἀθηναῖος: ὅθενπερ καὶ τὴν τῶν πόλεων ἐπίδοσιν εἰς ἀρετὴν μεταβαίνουσαν ἅμα καὶ κακίαν ἑκάστοτε θεατέον.
Κλεινίας: λέγεις δὲ πόθεν;
Ἀθηναῖος: οἶμαι μὲν ἀπὸ χρόνου μήκους τε καὶ ἀπειρίας καὶ

τῶν μεταβολῶν ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ.
Κλεινίας: πῶς λέγεις;
Ἀθηναῖος: φέρε, ἀφ' οὗ πόλεις τ' εἰσὶν καὶ ἄνθρωποι πολιτευόμενοι, δοκεῖς ἄν ποτε κατανοῆσαι χρόνου πλῆθος ὅσον γέγονεν;
Κλεινίας: οὔκουν ῥᾴδιόν γε οὐδαμῶς.
Ἀθηναῖος: τὸ δέ γε ὡς ἄπλετόν τι καὶ ἀμήχανον ἂν εἴη;
Κλεινίας: πάνυ μὲν οὖν τοῦτό γε.
Ἀθηναῖος: μῶν οὖν οὐ μυρίαι μὲν ἐπὶ μυρίαις ἡμῖν γεγόνασι πόλεις ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ, κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τοῦ πλήθους

λόγον οὐκ ἐλάττους ἐφθαρμέναι; πεπολιτευμέναι δ' αὖ πάσας πολιτείας πολλάκις ἑκασταχοῦ; καὶ τοτὲ μὲν ἐξ ἐλαττόνων μείζους, τοτὲ δ' ἐκ μειζόνων ἐλάττους, καὶ χείρους ἐκ βελτιόνων γεγόνασι καὶ βελτίους ἐκ χειρόνων;
Κλεινίας: ἀναγκαῖον.
Ἀθηναῖος: ταύτης δὴ πέρι λάβωμεν, εἰ δυναίμεθα, τῆς μεταβολῆς τὴν αἰτίαν: τάχα γὰρ ἂν ἴσως δείξειεν ἡμῖν τὴν πρώτην τῶν πολιτειῶν γένεσιν καὶ μετάβασιν.
Κλεινίας: εὖ λέγεις, καὶ προθυμεῖσθαι δεῖ, σὲ μὲν ὃ διανοῇ περὶ αὐτῶν ἀποφαινόμενον, ἡμᾶς δὲ συνεπομένους.

Ἀθηναῖος: ἆρ' οὖν ὑμῖν οἱ παλαιοὶ λόγοι ἀλήθειαν ἔχειν τινὰ δοκοῦσιν;
Κλεινίας: ποῖοι δή;
Ἀθηναῖος: τὸ πολλὰς ἀνθρώπων φθορὰς γεγονέναι κατακλυσμοῖς τε καὶ νόσοις καὶ ἄλλοις πολλοῖς, ἐν οἷς βραχύ τι τῶν ἀνθρώπων λείπεσθαι γένος.
Κλεινίας: πάνυ μὲν οὖν πιθανὸν τὸ τοιοῦτον πᾶν παντί.
Ἀθηναῖος: φέρε δή, νοήσωμεν μίαν τῶν πολλῶν ταύτην τὴν τῷ κατακλυσμῷ ποτε γενομένην.
Κλεινίας: τὸ ποῖόν τι περὶ αὐτῆς διανοηθέντες;

Ἀθηναῖος: ὡς οἱ τότε περιφυγόντες τὴν φθορὰν σχεδὸν ὄρειοί τινες ἂν εἶεν νομῆς, ἐν κορυφαῖς που σμικρὰ ζώπυρα τοῦ τῶν ἀνθρώπων διασεσωμένα γένους.
Κλεινίας: δῆλον.
Ἀθηναῖος: καὶ δὴ τοὺς τοιούτους γε ἀνάγκη που τῶν ἄλλων ἀπείρους εἶναι τεχνῶν καὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἄστεσι πρὸς ἀλλήλους μηχανῶν εἴς τε πλεονεξίας καὶ φιλονικίας καὶ ὁπός' ἄλλα κακουργήματα πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἐπινοοῦσιν.
Κλεινίας: εἰκὸς γοῦν.

Ἀθηναῖος: θῶμεν δὴ τὰς ἐν τοῖς πεδίοις πόλεις καὶ πρὸς θαλάττῃ κατοικούσας ἄρδην ἐν τῷ τότε χρόνῳ διαφθείρεσθαι;
Κλεινίας: θῶμεν.
Ἀθηναῖος: οὐκοῦν ὄργανά τε πάντα ἀπόλλυσθαι, καὶ εἴ τι τέχνης ἦν ἐχόμενον σπουδαίως ηὑρημένον ἢ πολιτικῆς ἢ καὶ σοφίας τινὸς ἑτέρας, πάντα ἔρρειν ταῦτα ἐν τῷ τότε χρόνῳ φήσομεν; πῶς γὰρ ἄν, ὦ ἄριστε, εἴ γε ἔμενεν τάδε οὕτω τὸν πάντα χρόνον ὡς νῦν διακεκόσμηται, καινὸν ἀνηυρίσκετό ποτε καὶ ὁτιοῦν;

Κλεινίας: τοῦτο ὅτι μὲν μυριάκις μύρια ἔτη διελάνθανεν ἄρα τοὺς τότε, χίλια δὲ ἀφ' οὗ γέγονεν ἢ δὶς τοσαῦτα ἔτη, τὰ μὲν Δαιδάλῳ καταφανῆ γέγονεν, τὰ δὲ Ὀρφεῖ, τὰ δὲ Παλαμήδει, τὰ δὲ περὶ μουσικὴν Μαρσύᾳ καὶ Ὀλύμπῳ, περὶ λύραν δὲ Ἀμφίονι, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ἄλλοις πάμπολλα, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν χθὲς καὶ πρῴην γεγονότα.
Ἀθηναῖος: ἄριστ', ὦ Κλεινία, τὸν φίλον ὅτι παρέλιπες, τὸν ἀτεχνῶς χθὲς γενόμενον.
Κλεινίας: μῶν φράζεις Ἐπιμενίδην;

Ἀθηναῖος: ναί, τοῦτον: πολὺ γὰρ ὑμῖν ὑπερεπήδησε τῷ μηχανήματι τοὺς σύμπαντας, ὦ φίλε, ὃ λόγῳ μὲν Ἡσίοδος ἐμαντεύετο πάλαι, τῷ δὲ ἔργῳ ἐκεῖνος ἀπετέλεσεν, ὡς ὑμεῖς φατε.
Κλεινίας: φαμὲν γὰρ οὖν.
Ἀθηναῖος: οὐκοῦν οὕτω δὴ λέγωμεν ἔχειν τότε, ὅτ' ἐγένετο ἡ φθορά, τὰ περὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους πράγματα, μυρίαν μέν τινα φοβερὰν ἐρημίαν, γῆς δ' ἀφθόνου πλῆθος πάμπολυ, ζῴων δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ἐρρόντων, βουκόλι' ἄττα, καὶ εἴ τί που αἰγῶν περιλειφθὲν ἐτύγχανεν γένος, σπάνια καὶ ταῦτα

νέμουσιν εἶναι ζῆν τότε κατ' ἀρχάς;
Κλεινίας: τί μήν;
Ἀθηναῖος: πόλεως δὲ καὶ πολιτείας πέρι καὶ νομοθεσίας, ὧν νῦν ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν παρέστηκεν, ἆρ' ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οἰόμεθα καὶ μνήμην εἶναι τὸ παράπαν;
Κλεινίας: οὐδαμῶς.
Ἀθηναῖος: οὐκοῦν ἐξ ἐκείνων τῶν διακειμένων οὕτω τὰ νῦν γέγονεν ἡμῖν σύμπαντα, πόλεις τε καὶ πολιτεῖαι καὶ τέχναι καὶ νόμοι, καὶ πολλὴ μὲν πονηρία, πολλὴ δὲ καὶ ἀρετή;
Κλεινίας: πῶς λέγεις;

Ἀθηναῖος: ἆρ' οἰόμεθα, ὦ θαυμάσιε, τοὺς τότε, ἀπείρους ὄντας πολλῶν μὲν καλῶν τῶν κατὰ τὰ ἄστη, πολλῶν δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων, τελέους πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἢ πρὸς κακίαν γεγονέναι;
Κλεινίας: καλῶς εἶπες, καὶ μανθάνομεν ὃ λέγεις.
Ἀθηναῖος: οὐκοῦν προϊόντος μὲν τοῦ χρόνου, πληθύοντος δ' ἡμῶν τοῦ γένους, εἰς πάντα τὰ νῦν καθεστηκότα προελήλυθεν πάντα;
Κλεινίας: ὀρθότατα.
Ἀθηναῖος: οὐκ ἐξαίφνης γε, ὡς εἰκός, κατὰ σμικρὸν δὲ ἐν παμπόλλῳ τινὶ χρόνῳ.

Κλεινίας: καὶ μάλα πρέπει τοῦθ' οὕτως.
Ἀθηναῖος: ἐκ γὰρ τῶν ὑψηλῶν εἰς τὰ πεδία καταβαίνειν, οἶμαι, πᾶσιν φόβος ἔναυλος ἐγεγόνει.
Κλεινίας: πῶς δ' οὔ;
Ἀθηναῖος: ἆρ' οὐχ ἅσμενοι μὲν ἑαυτοὺς ἑώρων δι' ὀλιγότητα ἐν τοῖς περὶ ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον, πορεῖα δέ, ὥστ' ἐπ' ἀλλήλους τότε πορεύεσθαι κατὰ γῆν ἢ κατὰ θάλατταν, σὺν ταῖς τέχναις ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν πάντα σχεδὸν ἀπωλώλει; συμμίσγειν οὖν ἀλλήλοις οὐκ ἦν οἶμαι σφόδρα δυνατόν: σίδηρος γὰρ

καὶ χαλκὸς καὶ πάντα τὰ μεταλλεῖα συγκεχυμένα ἠφάνιστο, ὥστε ἀπορία πᾶσα ἦν τοῦ ἀνακαθαίρεσθαι τὰ τοιαῦτα, δρυοτομίας τε εἶχον σπάνιν. εἰ γάρ πού τι καὶ περιγεγονὸς ἦν ὄργανον ἐν ὄρεσι, ταῦτα μὲν ταχὺ κατατριβέντα ἠφάνιστο, ἄλλα δὲ οὐκ ἔμελλεν γενήσεσθαι, πρὶν πάλιν ἡ τῶν μεταλλέων ἀφίκοιτο εἰς ἀνθρώπους τέχνη.
Κλεινίας: πῶς γὰρ ἄν;
Ἀθηναῖος: γενεαῖς δὴ πόσαις ὕστερον οἰόμεθα τοῦθ' οὕτως γεγονέναι;

Κλεινίας: δῆλον ὅτι παμπόλλαις τισίν.
Ἀθηναῖος: οὐκοῦν καὶ τέχναι, ὅσαιπερ σιδήρου δέονται καὶ χαλκοῦ καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἁπάντων, τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον καὶ ἔτι πλείονα ἠφανισμέναι ἂν εἶεν ἐν τῷ τότε;
Κλεινίας: τί μήν;
Ἀθηναῖος: καὶ τοίνυν στάσις ἅμα καὶ πόλεμος ἀπωλώλει κατὰ τὸν τότε χρόνον πολλαχῇ.
Κλεινίας: πῶς;
Ἀθηναῖος: πρῶτον μὲν ἠγάπων καὶ ἐφιλοφρονοῦντο ἀλλήλους δι' ἐρημίαν, ἔπειτα οὐ περιμάχητος ἦν αὐτοῖς ἡ τροφή.

νομῆς γὰρ οὐκ ἦν σπάνις, εἰ μή τισιν κατ' ἀρχὰς ἴσως, ᾗ δὴ τὸ πλεῖστον διέζων ἐν τῷ τότε χρόνῳ: γάλακτος γὰρ καὶ κρεῶν οὐδαμῶς ἐνδεεῖς ἦσαν, ἔτι δὲ θηρεύοντες οὐ φαύλην οὐδ' ὀλίγην τροφὴν παρείχοντο. καὶ μὴν ἀμπεχόνης γε καὶ στρωμνῆς καὶ οἰκήσεων καὶ σκευῶν ἐμπύρων τε καὶ ἀπύρων ηὐπόρουν: αἱ πλαστικαὶ γὰρ καὶ ὅσαι πλεκτικαὶ τῶν τεχνῶν οὐδὲ ἓν προσδέονται σιδήρου, ταῦτα δὲ

πάντα τούτω τὼ τέχνα θεὸς ἔδωκε πορίζειν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἵν' ὁπότε εἰς τὴν τοιαύτην ἀπορίαν ἔλθοιεν, ἔχοι βλάστην καὶ ἐπίδοσιν τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος. πένητες μὲν δὴ διὰ τὸ τοιοῦτον σφόδρα οὐκ ἦσαν, οὐδ' ὑπὸ πενίας ἀναγκαζόμενοι διάφοροι ἑαυτοῖς ἐγίγνοντο: πλούσιοι δ' οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἐγένοντο ἄχρυσοί τε καὶ ἀνάργυροι ὄντες, ὃ τότε ἐν ἐκείνοις παρῆν. ᾗ δ' ἄν ποτε συνοικίᾳ μήτε πλοῦτος συνοικῇ μήτε πενία, σχεδὸν ἐν ταύτῃ γενναιότατα ἤθη γίγνοιτ' ἄν: οὔτε

γὰρ ὕβρις οὔτ' ἀδικία, ζῆλοί τε αὖ καὶ φθόνοι οὐκ ἐγγίγνονται. ἀγαθοὶ μὲν δὴ διὰ ταῦτά τε ἦσαν καὶ διὰ τὴν λεγομένην εὐήθειαν: ἃ γὰρ ἤκουον καλὰ καὶ αἰσχρά, εὐήθεις ὄντες ἡγοῦντο ἀληθέστατα λέγεσθαι καὶ ἐπείθοντο. ψεῦδος γὰρ ὑπονοεῖν οὐδεὶς ἠπίστατο διὰ σοφίαν, ὥσπερ τὰ νῦν, ἀλλὰ περὶ θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων τὰ λεγόμενα ἀληθῆ νομίζοντες ἔζων κατὰ ταῦτα: διόπερ ἦσαν τοιοῦτοι παντάπασιν οἵους αὐτοὺς ἡμεῖς ἄρτι διεληλύθαμεν.

Κλεινίας: ἐμοὶ γοῦν δὴ καὶ τῷδε οὕτως ταῦτα συνδοκεῖ.
Ἀθηναῖος: οὐκοῦν εἴπωμεν ὅτι γενεαὶ διαβιοῦσαι πολλαὶ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον τῶν πρὸ κατακλυσμοῦ γεγονότων καὶ τῶν νῦν ἀτεχνότεροι μὲν καὶ ἀμαθέστεροι πρός τε τὰς ἄλλας μέλλουσιν εἶναι τέχνας καὶ πρὸς τὰς πολεμικάς, ὅσαι τε πεζαὶ καὶ ὅσαι κατὰ θάλατταν γίγνονται τὰ νῦν, καὶ ὅσαι δὴ κατὰ πόλιν μόνον αὐτοῦ, δίκαι καὶ στάσεις λεγόμεναι, λόγοις

ἔργοις τε μεμηχανημέναι πάσας μηχανὰς εἰς τὸ κακουργεῖν τε ἀλλήλους καὶ ἀδικεῖν, εὐηθέστεροι δὲ καὶ ἀνδρειότεροι καὶ ἅμα σωφρονέστεροι καὶ σύμπαντα δικαιότεροι; τὸ δὲ τούτων αἴτιον ἤδη διεληλύθαμεν.
Κλεινίας: ὀρθῶς λέγεις.
Ἀθηναῖος: λελέχθω δὴ ταῦτα ἡμῖν καὶ τὰ τούτοις συνεπόμενα ἔτι πάντα εἰρήσθω τοῦδ' ἕνεκα, ἵνα νοήσωμεν τοῖς τότε

νόμων τίς ποτ' ἦν χρεία καὶ τίς ἦν νομοθέτης αὐτοῖς.
Κλεινίας: καὶ καλῶς γε εἴρηκας.
Ἀθηναῖος: ἆρ' οὖν ἐκεῖνοι μὲν οὔτ' ἐδέοντο νομοθετῶν οὔτε πω ἐφίλει κατὰ τούτους τοὺς χρόνους γίγνεσθαι τὸ τοιοῦτον; οὐδὲ γὰρ γράμματα ἔστι πω τοῖς ἐν τούτῳ τῷ μέρει τῆς περιόδου γεγονόσιν, ἀλλ' ἔθεσι καὶ τοῖς λεγομένοις πατρίοις νόμοις ἑπόμενοι ζῶσιν.
Κλεινίας: εἰκὸς γοῦν.
Ἀθηναῖος: πολιτείας δέ γε ἤδη καὶ τρόπος ἐστίν τις οὗτος.
Κλεινίας: τίς;

Ἀθηναῖος: δοκοῦσί μοι πάντες τὴν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ πολιτείαν δυναστείαν καλεῖν, ἣ καὶ νῦν ἔτι πολλαχοῦ καὶ ἐν Ἕλλησι καὶ κατὰ βαρβάρους ἐστίν: λέγει δ' αὐτήν που καὶ Ὅμηρος γεγονέναι περὶ τὴν τῶν Κυκλώπων οἴκησιν, εἰπὼν— “τοῖσιν δ' οὔτ' ἀγοραὶ βουληφόροι οὔτε θέμιστες, ἀλλ' οἵ γ' ὑψηλῶν ὀρέων ναίουσι κάρηνα ἐν σπέσσι γλαφυροῖσι, θεμιστεύει δὲ ἕκαστοσ”

“παίδων ἠδ' ἀλόχων, οὐδ' ἀλλήλων ἀλέγουσιν.”
Κλεινίας: ἔοικέν γε ὁ ποιητὴς ὑμῖν οὗτος γεγονέναι χαρίεις. καὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ ἄλλα αὐτοῦ διεληλύθαμεν μάλ' ἀστεῖα, οὐ μὴν πολλά γε: οὐ γὰρ σφόδρα χρώμεθα οἱ Κρῆτες τοῖς ξενικοῖς ποιήμασιν.
Μέγιλλος: ἡμεῖς δ' αὖ χρώμεθα μέν, καὶ ἔοικέν γε κρατεῖν τῶν τοιούτων ποιητῶν, οὐ μέντοι Λακωνικόν γε ἀλλά τινα

μᾶλλον Ἰωνικὸν βίον διεξέρχεται ἑκάστοτε. νῦν μὴν εὖ τῷ σῷ λόγῳ ἔοικε μαρτυρεῖν, τὸ ἀρχαῖον αὐτῶν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀγριότητα διὰ μυθολογίας ἐπανενεγκών.
Ἀθηναῖος: ναί: συμμαρτυρεῖ γάρ, καὶ λάβωμέν γε αὐτὸν μηνυτὴν ὅτι τοιαῦται πολιτεῖαι γίγνονταί ποτε.
Κλεινίας: καλῶς.
Ἀθηναῖος: μῶν οὖν οὐκ ἐκ τούτων τῶν κατὰ μίαν οἴκησιν καὶ κατὰ γένος διεσπαρμένων ὑπὸ ἀπορίας τῆς ἐν ταῖς φθοραῖς,

ἐν αἷς τὸ πρεσβύτατον ἄρχει διὰ τὸ τὴν ἀρχὴν αὐτοῖς ἐκ πατρὸς καὶ μητρὸς γεγονέναι, οἷς ἑπόμενοι καθάπερ ὄρνιθες ἀγέλην μίαν ποιήσουσι, πατρονομούμενοι καὶ βασιλείαν πασῶν δικαιοτάτην βασιλευόμενοι;
Κλεινίας: πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
Ἀθηναῖος: μετὰ δὲ ταῦτά γε εἰς τὸ κοινὸν μείζους ποιοῦντες πόλεις πλείους συνέρχονται, καὶ ἐπὶ γεωργίας τὰς ἐν ταῖς

ὑπωρείαις τρέπονται πρώτας, περιβόλους τε αἱμασιώδεις τινὰς τειχῶν ἐρύματα τῶν θηρίων ἕνεκα ποιοῦνται, μίαν οἰκίαν αὖ κοινὴν καὶ μεγάλην ἀποτελοῦντες.
Κλεινίας: τὸ γοῦν εἰκὸς ταῦθ' οὕτως γίγνεσθαι.
Ἀθηναῖος: τί δέ; τόδε ἆρα οὐκ εἰκός;
Κλεινίας: τὸ ποῖον;
Ἀθηναῖος: τῶν οἰκήσεων τούτων μειζόνων αὐξανομένων ἐκ τῶν ἐλαττόνων καὶ πρώτων, ἑκάστην τῶν σμικρῶν παρεῖναι κατὰ γένος ἔχουσαν τόν τε πρεσβύτατον ἄρχοντα καὶ αὑτῆς

ἔθη ἄττα ἴδια διὰ τὸ χωρὶς ἀλλήλων οἰκεῖν, ἕτερα ἀφ' ἑτέρων ὄντων τῶν γεννητόρων τε καὶ θρεψάντων, ἃ εἰθίσθησαν περὶ θεούς τε καὶ ἑαυτούς, κοσμιωτέρων μὲν κοσμιώτερα καὶ ἀνδρικῶν ἀνδρικώτερα, καὶ κατὰ τρόπον οὕτως ἑκάστους τὰς αὑτῶν ἂν αἱρέσεις εἰς τοὺς παῖδας ἀποτυπουμένους καὶ παίδων παῖδας, ὃ λέγομεν, ἥκειν ἔχοντας ἰδίους νόμους εἰς τὴν μείζονα συνοικίαν.
Κλεινίας: πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

Ἀθηναῖος: καὶ μὴν τούς γε αὑτῶν νόμους ἀρέσκειν ἑκάστοις ἀναγκαῖόν που, τοὺς δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ὑστέρους.
Κλεινίας: οὕτως.
Ἀθηναῖος: ἀρχῇ δὴ νομοθεσίας οἷον ἐμβάντες ἐλάθομεν, ὡς ἔοικεν.
Κλεινίας: πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
Ἀθηναῖος: τὸ γοῦν μετὰ ταῦτα ἀναγκαῖον αἱρεῖσθαι τοὺς συνελθόντας τούτους κοινούς τινας ἑαυτῶν, οἳ δὴ τὰ πάντων ἰδόντες νόμιμα, τά σφισιν ἀρέσκοντα αὐτῶν μάλιστα εἰς τὸ κοινὸν τοῖς ἡγεμόσι καὶ ἀγαγοῦσι τοὺς δήμους οἷον

βασιλεῦσι φανερὰ δείξαντες ἑλέσθαι τε δόντες, αὐτοὶ μὲν νομοθέται κληθήσονται, τοὺς δὲ ἄρχοντας καταστήσαντες, ἀριστοκρατίαν τινὰ ἐκ τῶν δυναστειῶν ποιήσαντες ἢ καί τινα βασιλείαν, ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ μεταβολῇ τῆς πολιτείας οἰκήσουσιν.
Κλεινίας: ἐφεξῆς γοῦν ἂν οὕτω τε καὶ ταύτῃ γίγνοιτο.
Ἀθηναῖος: τρίτον τοίνυν εἴπωμεν ἔτι πολιτείας σχῆμα γιγνόμενον, ἐν ᾧ δὴ πάντα εἴδη καὶ παθήματα πολιτειῶν καὶ ἅμα πόλεων συμπίπτει γίγνεσθαι.
Κλεινίας: τὸ ποῖον δὴ τοῦτο;

Ἀθηναῖος: ὃ μετὰ τὸ δεύτερον καὶ Ὅμηρος ἐπεσημήνατο, λέγων τὸ τρίτον οὕτω γεγονέναι. “. . . κτίσσε δὲ Δαρδανίην” γάρ πού φησιν, “. . . ἐπεὶ οὔπω Ἴλιος ἱρὴ ἐν πεδίῳ πεπόλιστο, πόλις μερόπων ἀνθρώπων, ἀλλ' ἔθ' ὑπωρείας ᾤκουν πολυπιδάκου Ἴδης.”

λέγει γὰρ δὴ ταῦτα τὰ ἔπη καὶ ἐκεῖνα, ἃ περὶ τῶν Κυκλώπων εἴρηκεν, κατὰ θεόν πως εἰρημένα καὶ κατὰ φύσιν: θεῖον γὰρ οὖν δὴ καὶ τὸ ποιητικὸν ἐνθεαστικὸν ὂν γένος ὑμνῳδοῦν, πολλῶν τῶν κατ' ἀλήθειαν γιγνομένων σύν τισιν Χάρισιν καὶ Μούσαις ἐφάπτεται ἑκάστοτε.
Κλεινίας: καὶ μάλα.
Ἀθηναῖος: εἰς δὴ τὸ πρόσθεν προέλθωμεν ἔτι τοῦ νῦν ἐπελθόντος ἡμῖν μύθου: τάχα γὰρ ἂν σημήνειέ τι τῆς ἡμετέρας περὶ βουλήσεως. οὐκοῦν χρή;

Κλεινίας: πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
Ἀθηναῖος: κατῳκίσθη δή, φαμέν, ἐκ τῶν ὑψηλῶν εἰς μέγα τε καὶ καλὸν πεδίον Ἴλιον, ἐπὶ λόφον τινὰ οὐχ ὑψηλὸν καὶ ἔχοντα ποταμοὺς πολλοὺς ἄνωθεν ἐκ τῆς Ἴδης ὡρμημένους.
Κλεινίας: φασὶ γοῦν.
Ἀθηναῖος: ἆρ' οὖν οὐκ ἐν πολλοῖς τισι χρόνοις τοῖς μετὰ τὸν κατακλυσμὸν τοῦτο οἰόμεθα γεγονέναι;
Κλεινίας: πῶς δ' οὐκ ἐν πολλοῖς;
Ἀθηναῖος: δεινὴ γοῦν ἔοικεν αὐτοῖς λήθη τότε παρεῖναι τῆς

νῦν λεγομένης φθορᾶς, ὅθ' οὕτως ὑπὸ ποταμοὺς πολλοὺς καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὑψηλῶν ῥέοντας πόλιν ὑπέθεσαν, πιστεύσαντες οὐ σφόδρα ὑψηλοῖς τισιν λόφοις.
Κλεινίας: δῆλον οὖν ὡς παντάπασί τι<να> μακρὸν ἀπεῖχον χρόνον τοῦ τοιούτου πάθους.
Ἀθηναῖος: καὶ ἄλλαι γε οἶμαι πόλεις τότε κατῴκουν ἤδη πολλαί, πληθυόντων τῶν ἀνθρώπων.
Κλεινίας: τί μήν;
Ἀθηναῖος: αἵ γέ που καὶ ἐπεστρατεύσαντο αὐτῇ, καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν δὲ ἴσως, ἀφόβως ἤδη πάντων χρωμένων τῇ θαλάττῃ.

Κλεινίας: φαίνεται.
Ἀθηναῖος: δέκα δ' ἔτη που μείναντες Ἀχαιοὶ τὴν Τροίαν ἀνάστατον ἐποίησαν.
Κλεινίας: καὶ μάλα.
Ἀθηναῖος: οὐκοῦν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ, ὄντι δεκέτει, ὃν τὸ Ἴλιον ἐπολιορκεῖτο, τὰ τῶν πολιορκούντων ἑκάστων οἴκοι κακὰ πολλὰ συνέβαινεν γιγνόμενα περὶ τὰς στάσεις τῶν νέων, οἳ καὶ ἀφικομένους τοὺς στρατιώτας εἰς τὰς αὑτῶν πόλεις τε καὶ οἰκίας οὐ καλῶς οὐδ' ἐν δίκῃ ὑπεδέξαντο,

ἀλλ' ὥστε θανάτους τε καὶ σφαγὰς καὶ φυγὰς γενέσθαι παμπόλλας: οἳ πάλιν ἐκπεσόντες κατῆλθον μεταβαλόντες ὄνομα, Δωριῆς ἀντ' Ἀχαιῶν κληθέντες διὰ τὸ τὸν συλλέξαντα εἶναι τὰς τότε φυγὰς Δωριᾶ. καὶ δὴ ταῦτά γε ἤδη πάνθ' ὑμεῖς, ὦ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, τἀντεῦθεν μυθολογεῖτέ τε καὶ διαπεραίνετε.
Μέγιλλος: τί μήν;
Ἀθηναῖος: ὅθεν δὴ κατ' ἀρχὰς ἐξετραπόμεθα περὶ νόμων διαλεγόμενοι, περιπεσόντες μουσικῇ τε καὶ ταῖς μέθαις, νῦν ἐπὶ τὰ αὐτὰ πάλιν ἀφίγμεθα ὥσπερ κατὰ θεόν, καὶ ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν οἷον λαβὴν ἀποδίδωσιν: ἥκει γὰρ ἐπὶ τὴν εἰς Λακεδαίμονα

κατοίκισιν αὐτήν, ἣν ὑμεῖς ὀρθῶς ἔφατε κατοικεῖσθαι καὶ Κρήτην ὡς ἀδελφοῖς νόμοις. νῦν οὖν δὴ τοσόνδε πλεονεκτοῦμεν τῇ πλάνῃ τοῦ λόγου, διὰ πολιτειῶν τινων καὶ κατοικισμῶν διεξελθόντες: ἐθεασάμεθα πρώτην τε καὶ δευτέραν καὶ τρίτην πόλιν, ἀλλήλων, ὡς οἰόμεθα, ταῖς κατοικίσεσιν ἐχομένας ἐν χρόνου τινὸς μήκεσιν ἀπλέτοις, νῦν δὲ δὴ τετάρτη τις ἡμῖν αὕτη πόλις, εἰ δὲ βούλεσθε, ἔθνος ἥκει κατοικιζόμενόν τέ ποτε καὶ νῦν κατῳκισμένον.

ἐξ ὧν ἁπάντων εἴ τι συνεῖναι δυνάμεθα τί τε καλῶς ἢ μὴ κατῳκίσθη, καὶ ποῖοι νόμοι σῴζουσιν αὐτῶν τὰ σῳζόμενα καὶ ποῖοι φθείρουσι τὰ φθειρόμενα, καὶ ἀντὶ ποίων ποῖα μετατεθέντα εὐδαίμονα πόλιν ἀπεργάζοιτ' ἄν, ὦ Μέγιλλέ τε καὶ Κλεινία, ταῦτα δὴ πάλιν οἷον ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἡμῖν λεκτέον, εἰ μή τι τοῖς εἰρημένοις ἐγκαλοῦμεν λόγοις.
Μέγιλλος: εἰ γοῦν, ὦ ξένε, τις ἡμῖν ὑπόσχοιτο θεὸς ὡς, ἐὰν

ἐπιχειρήσωμεν τὸ δεύτερον τῇ τῆς νομοθεσίας σκέψει, τῶν νῦν εἰρημένων λόγων οὐ χείρους οὐδ' ἐλάττους ἀκουσόμεθα, μακρὰν ἂν ἔλθοιμι ἔγωγε, καί μοι βραχεῖ' ἂν δόξειεν ἡ νῦν παροῦσα ἡμέρα γίγνεσθαι. καίτοι σχεδόν γ' ἐστὶν ἡ ἐκ θερινῶν εἰς τὰ χειμερινὰ τοῦ θεοῦ τρεπομένου.
Ἀθηναῖος: χρὴ δὴ ταῦτα, ὡς ἔοικεν, σκοπεῖν.
Μέγιλλος: πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
Ἀθηναῖος: γενώμεθα δὴ ταῖς διανοίαις ἐν τῷ τότε χρόνῳ, ὅτε Λακεδαίμων μὲν καὶ Ἄργος καὶ Μεσσήνη καὶ τὰ μετὰ

τούτων ὑποχείρια τοῖς προγόνοις ὑμῶν, ὦ Μέγιλλε, ἱκανῶς ἐγεγόνει: τὸ δὲ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο ἔδοξεν αὐτοῖς, ὥς γε λέγεται τὸ τοῦ μύθου, τριχῇ τὸ στράτευμα διανείμαντας, τρεῖς πόλεις κατοικίζειν, Ἄργος, Μεσσήνην, Λακεδαίμονα.
Μέγιλλος: πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
Ἀθηναῖος: καὶ βασιλεὺς μὲν Ἄργους Τήμενος ἐγίγνετο, Μεσσήνης δὲ Κρεσφόντης, Λακεδαίμονος δὲ Προκλῆς καὶ Εὐρυσθένης.
Μέγιλλος: πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
Ἀθηναῖος: καὶ πάντες δὴ τούτοις ὤμοσαν οἱ τότε βοηθήσειν,

ἐάν τις τὴν βασιλείαν αὐτῶν διαφθείρῃ.
Μέγιλλος: τί μήν;
Ἀθηναῖος: βασιλεία δὲ καταλύεται, ὦ πρὸς Διός, ἢ καί τις ἀρχὴ πώποτε κατελύθη, μῶν ὑπό τινων ἄλλων ἢ σφῶν αὐτῶν; ἢ νυνδὴ μέν, ὀλίγον ἔμπροσθεν τούτοις περιτυχόντες τοῖς λόγοις, οὕτω ταῦτ' ἐτίθεμεν, νῦν δ' ἐπιλελήσμεθα;
Μέγιλλος: καὶ πῶς;
Ἀθηναῖος: οὐκοῦν νῦν δὴ μᾶλλον βεβαιωσόμεθα τὸ τοιοῦτον: περιτυχόντες γὰρ ἔργοις γενομένοις, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐπὶ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον ἐληλύθαμεν, ὥστε οὐ περὶ κενόν τι ζητήσομεν

τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, ἀλλὰ περὶ γεγονός τε καὶ ἔχον ἀλήθειαν. γέγονεν δὴ τάδε: βασιλεῖαι τρεῖς βασιλευομέναις πόλεσιν τριτταῖς ὤμοσαν ἀλλήλαις ἑκάτεραι, κατὰ νόμους οὓς ἔθεντο τοῦ τε ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι κοινούς, οἱ μὲν μὴ βιαιοτέραν τὴν ἀρχὴν ποιήσεσθαι προϊόντος τοῦ χρόνου καὶ γένους, οἱ δέ, ταῦτα ἐμπεδούντων τῶν ἀρχόντων, μήτε αὐτοὶ τὰς βασιλείας ποτὲ καταλύσειν μήτ' ἐπιτρέψειν ἐπιχειροῦσιν

ἑτέροις, βοηθήσειν δὲ βασιλῆς τε βασιλεῦσιν ἀδικουμένοις καὶ δήμοις, καὶ δῆμοι δήμοις καὶ βασιλεῦσιν ἀδικουμένοις. ἆρ' οὐχ οὕτως;
Μέγιλλος: οὕτω μὲν οὖν.
Ἀθηναῖος: οὐκοῦν τό γε μέγιστον ταῖς καταστάσεσιν τῶν πολιτειῶν ὑπῆρχεν ταῖς ἐν ταῖς τρισὶ πόλεσι νομοθετουμέναις, εἴτε οἱ βασιλῆς ἐνομοθέτουν εἴτ' ἄλλοι τινές;
Μέγιλλος: ποῖον;
Ἀθηναῖος: τὸ βοηθούς γε εἶναι τὰς δύο ἐπὶ τὴν μίαν ἀεὶ πόλιν, τὴν τοῖς τεθεῖσιν νόμοις ἀπειθοῦσαν.
Μέγιλλος: δῆλον.

Ἀθηναῖος: καὶ μὴν τοῦτό γε οἱ πολλοὶ προστάττουσιν τοῖς νομοθέταις, ὅπως τοιούτους θήσουσιν τοὺς νόμους οὓς ἑκόντες οἱ δῆμοι καὶ τὰ πλήθη δέξονται, καθάπερ ἂν εἴ τις γυμνασταῖς ἢ ἰατροῖς προστάττοι μεθ' ἡδονῆς θεραπεύειν τε καὶ ἰᾶσθαι τὰ θεραπευόμενα σώματα.
Μέγιλλος: παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.
Ἀθηναῖος: τὸ δέ γ' ἐστὶν ἀγαπητὸν πολλάκις εἰ καί τις μετὰ λύπης μὴ μεγάλης δύναιτο εὐεκτικά τε καὶ ὑγιῆ σώματα ἀπεργάζεσθαι.
Μέγιλλος: τί μήν;

Ἀθηναῖος: καὶ τόδε γε ἔτι τοῖς τότε ὑπῆρχεν οὐ σμικρὸν εἰς ῥᾳστώνην τῆς θέσεως τῶν νόμων.
Μέγιλλος: τὸ ποῖον;
Ἀθηναῖος: οὐκ ἦν τοῖς νομοθέταις ἡ μεγίστη τῶν μέμψεων, ἰσότητα αὐτοῖς τινα κατασκευάζουσιν τῆς οὐσίας, ἥπερ ἐν ἄλλαις νομοθετουμέναις πόλεσι πολλαῖς γίγνεται, ἐάν τις ζητῇ γῆς τε κτῆσιν κινεῖν καὶ χρεῶν διάλυσιν, ὁρῶν ὡς οὐκ ἂν δύναιτο ἄνευ τούτων γενέσθαι ποτὲ τὸ ἴσον ἱκανῶς: ὡς ἐπιχειροῦντι δὴ νομοθέτῃ κινεῖν τῶν τοιούτων τι πᾶς ἀπαντᾷ

λέγων μὴ κινεῖν τὰ ἀκίνητα, καὶ ἐπαρᾶται γῆς τε ἀναδασμοὺς εἰσηγούμενον καὶ χρεῶν ἀποκοπάς, ὥστ' εἰς ἀπορίαν καθίστασθαι πάντ' ἄνδρα. τοῖς δὲ δὴ Δωριεῦσι καὶ τοῦθ' οὕτως ὑπῆρχεν καλῶς καὶ ἀνεμεσήτως, γῆν τε ἀναμφισβητήτως διανέμεσθαι, καὶ χρέα μεγάλα καὶ παλαιὰ οὐκ ἦν.
Μέγιλλος: ἀληθῆ.
Ἀθηναῖος: πῇ δή ποτε οὖν, ὦ ἄριστοι, κακῶς οὕτως αὐτοῖς ἐχώρησεν ἡ κατοίκισίς τε καὶ νομοθεσία;

Μέγιλλος: πῶς δὴ καὶ τί μεμφόμενος αὐτῶν λέγεις;
Ἀθηναῖος: ὅτι τριῶν γενομένων τῶν οἰκήσεων τὰ δύο αὐτῶν μέρη ταχὺ τήν τε πολιτείαν καὶ τοὺς νόμους διέφθειρεν, τὸ δὲ ἓν μόνον ἔμεινεν, τὸ τῆς ὑμετέρας πόλεως.
Μέγιλλος: οὐ πάνυ ῥᾴδιον ἐρωτᾷς.
Ἀθηναῖος: ἀλλὰ μὴν δεῖ γε ἡμᾶς τοῦτο ἐν τῷ νῦν σκοποῦντας καὶ ἐξετάζοντας, περὶ νόμων παίζοντας παιδιὰν πρεσβυτικὴν σώφρονα, διελθεῖν τὴν ὁδὸν ἀλύπως, ὡς ἔφαμεν ἡνίκα

ἠρχόμεθα πορεύεσθαι.
Μέγιλλος: τί μήν; καὶ ποιητέον γε ὡς λέγεις.
Ἀθηναῖος: τίν' οὖν ἂν σκέψιν καλλίω ποιησαίμεθα περὶ νόμων ἢ τούτων οἳ ταύτας διακεκοσμήκασιν; ἢ πόλεων περὶ τίνων εὐδοκιμωτέρων τε καὶ μειζόνων κατοικίσεων σκοποίμεθ' ἄν;
Μέγιλλος: οὐ ῥᾴδιον ἀντὶ τούτων ἑτέρας λέγειν.
Ἀθηναῖος: οὐκοῦν ὅτι μὲν διενοοῦντό γε οἱ τότε τὴν κατασκευὴν ταύτην οὐ Πελοποννήσῳ μόνον ἔσεσθαι βοηθὸν

ἱκανήν, σχεδὸν δῆλον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς Ἕλλησιν πᾶσιν, εἴ τις τῶν βαρβάρων αὐτοὺς ἀδικοῖ, καθάπερ οἱ περὶ τὸ Ἴλιον οἰκοῦντες τότε, πιστεύοντες τῇ τῶν Ἀσσυρίων δυνάμει τῇ περὶ Νῖνον γενομένῃ, θρασυνόμενοι τὸν πόλεμον ἤγειραν τὸν ἐπὶ Τροίαν. ἦν γὰρ ἔτι τὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἐκείνης σχῆμα τὸ σῳζόμενον οὐ σμικρόν: καθάπερ νῦν τὸν μέγαν βασιλέα φοβούμεθα ἡμεῖς, καὶ τότε ἐκείνην τὴν συσταθεῖσαν σύνταξιν ἐδέδισαν οἱ τότε. μέγα γὰρ ἔγκλημα πρὸς αὐτοὺς

ἡ τῆς Τροίας ἅλωσις τὸ δεύτερον ἐγεγόνει: τῆς ἀρχῆς γὰρ τῆς ἐκείνων ἦν μόριον. πρὸς δὴ ταῦτ' ἦν πάντα ἡ τοῦ στρατοπέδου τοῦ τότε διανεμηθεῖσα εἰς τρεῖς πόλεις κατασκευὴ μία ὑπὸ βασιλέων ἀδελφῶν, παίδων Ἡρακλέους, καλῶς, ὡς ἐδόκει, ἀνηυρημένη καὶ κατακεκοσμημένη καὶ διαφερόντως τῆς ἐπὶ τὴν Τροίαν ἀφικομένης. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ τοὺς Ἡρακλείδας τῶν Πελοπιδῶν ἀμείνους ἡγοῦντο ἀρχόντων ἄρχοντας ἔχειν, ἔπειτ' αὖ τὸ στρατόπεδον τοῦτο

τοῦ ἐπὶ Τροίαν ἀφικομένου διαφέρειν πρὸς ἀρετήν: νενικηκέναι γὰρ τούτους, ἡττᾶσθαι δ' ὑπὸ τούτων ἐκείνους, Ἀχαιοὺς ὄντας ὑπὸ Δωριῶν. ἆρ' οὐχ οὕτως οἰόμεθα καί τινι διανοίᾳ ταύτῃ κατασκευάζεσθαι τοὺς τότε;
Μέγιλλος: πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
Ἀθηναῖος: οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ βεβαίως οἴεσθαι ταῦθ' ἕξειν εἰκὸς

αὐτοὺς καὶ χρόνον τιν' ἂν πολὺν μένειν, ἅτε κεκοινωνηκότας μὲν πολλῶν πόνων καὶ κινδύνων ἀλλήλοις, ὑπὸ γένους δὲ ἑνὸς τῶν βασιλέων ἀδελφῶν ὄντων διακεκοσμῆσθαι, πρὸς τούτοις δ' ἔτι καὶ πολλοῖς μάντεσι κεχρημένους εἶναι τοῖς τε ἄλλοις καὶ τῷ Δελφικῷ Ἀπόλλωνι;
Μέγιλλος: πῶς δ' οὐκ εἰκός;
Ἀθηναῖος: ταῦτα δὴ τὰ μεγάλα οὕτως προσδοκώμενα διέπτατο, ὡς ἔοικε, τότε ταχύ, πλὴν ὅπερ εἴπομεν νυνδὴ σμικροῦ

μέρους τοῦ περὶ τὸν ὑμέτερον τόπον, καὶ τοῦτο δὴ πρὸς τὰ δύο μέρη πολεμοῦν οὐ πώποτε πέπαυται μέχρι τὰ νῦν: ἐπεὶ γενομένη γε ἡ τότε διάνοια καὶ συμφωνήσασα εἰς ἕν, ἀνυπόστατον ἄν τινα δύναμιν ἔσχε κατὰ πόλεμον.
Μέγιλλος: πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
Ἀθηναῖος: πῶς οὖν καὶ πῇ διώλετο; ἆρ' οὐκ ἄξιον ἐπισκοπεῖν τηλικοῦτον καὶ τοιοῦτον σύστημα ἥτις ποτὲ τύχη διέφθειρε;
Μέγιλλος: σχολῇ γὰρ οὖν δή τις ἂν ἄλλο σκοπῶν, ἢ νόμους

ἢ πολιτείας ἄλλας θεάσαιτο σῳζούσας καλὰ καὶ μεγάλα πράγματα ἢ καὶ τοὐναντίον διαφθειρούσας τὸ παράπαν, εἰ ἀμελήσειε τούτων.
Ἀθηναῖος: τοῦτο μὲν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, εὐτυχῶς πως ἐμβεβήκαμέν γε εἴς τινα σκέψιν ἱκανήν.
Μέγιλλος: πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
Ἀθηναῖος: ἆρ' οὖν, ὦ θαυμάσιε, λελήθαμεν ἄνθρωποι πάντες, καὶ τὰ νῦν δὴ ἡμεῖς, οἰόμενοι μὲν ἑκάστοτέ τι καλὸν ὁρᾶν πρᾶγμα γενόμενον καὶ θαυμαστὰ ἂν ἐργασάμενον, εἴ τις ἄρα

ἠπιστήθη καλῶς αὐτῷ χρῆσθαι κατά τινα τρόπον, τὸ δὲ νῦν γε ἡμεῖς τάχ' ἂν ἴσως περὶ τοῦτο αὐτὸ οὔτ' ὀρθῶς διανοοίμεθα οὔτε κατὰ φύσιν, καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ τὰ ἄλλα πάντες πάντα, περὶ ὧν ἂν οὕτω διανοηθῶσιν;
Μέγιλλος: λέγεις δὲ δὴ τί, καὶ περὶ τίνος σοι φῶμεν μάλιστ' εἰρῆσθαι τοῦτον τὸν λόγον;
Ἀθηναῖος: ὠγαθέ, καὶ αὐτὸς ἐμαυτοῦ νυνδὴ κατεγέλασα. ἀποβλέψας γὰρ πρὸς τοῦτον τὸν στόλον οὗ πέρι διαλεγόμεθα, ἔδοξέ μοι πάγκαλός τε εἶναι καὶ θαυμαστὸν κτῆμα παραπεσεῖν τοῖς Ἕλλησιν, ὅπερ εἶπον, εἴ τις ἄρα αὐτῷ τότε

καλῶς ἐχρήσατο.
Μέγιλλος: οὐκοῦν εὖ καὶ ἐχόντως νοῦν σύ τε πάντα εἶπες καὶ ἐπῃνέσαμεν ἡμεῖς;
Ἀθηναῖος: ἴσως: ἐννοῶ γε μὴν ὡς πᾶς, ὃς ἂν ἴδῃ τι μέγα καὶ δύναμιν ἔχον πολλὴν καὶ ῥώμην, εὐθὺς ἔπαθε τοῦτο, ὡς εἴπερ ἐπίσταιτο ὁ κεκτημένος αὐτῷ χρῆσθαι τοιούτῳ τε ὄντι καὶ τηλικούτῳ, θαυμάστ' ἂν καὶ πολλὰ κατεργασάμενος εὐδαιμονοῖ.

Μέγιλλος: οὐκοῦν ὀρθὸν καὶ τοῦτο; ἢ πῶς λέγεις;
Ἀθηναῖος: σκόπει δὴ ποῖ βλέπων ὁ τὸν ἔπαινον τοῦτον περὶ ἑκάστου τιθέμενος ὀρθῶς λέγει: πρῶτον δὲ περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ νῦν λεγομένου, πῶς, εἰ κατὰ τρόπον ἠπιστήθησαν τάξαι τὸ στρατόπεδον οἱ τότε διακοσμοῦντες, τοῦ καιροῦ πως ἂν ἔτυχον; ἆρ' οὐκ εἰ συνέστησάν τε ἀσφαλῶς αὐτὸ διέσῳζόν τε εἰς τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον, ὥστε αὐτούς τε ἐλευθέρους εἶναι καὶ ἄλλων ἄρχοντας ὧν βουληθεῖεν, καὶ ὅλως ἐν ἀνθρώποις πᾶσι

καὶ Ἕλλησι καὶ βαρβάροις πράττειν ὅτι ἐπιθυμοῖεν αὐτοί τε καὶ οἱ ἔκγονοι; μῶν οὐ τούτων χάριν ἐπαινοῖεν ἄν;
Μέγιλλος: πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
Ἀθηναῖος: ἆρ' οὖν καὶ ὃς ἂν ἰδὼν πλοῦτον μέγαν ἢ τιμὰς διαφερούσας γένους, ἢ καὶ ὁτιοῦν τῶν τοιούτων, εἴπῃ ταὐτὰ ταῦτα, πρὸς τοῦτο βλέπων εἶπεν, ὡς διὰ τοῦτο αὐτῷ γενησόμενα ὧν ἂν ἐπιθυμῇ πάντα ἢ τὰ πλεῖστα καὶ ὅσα ἀξιώτατα λόγου;
Μέγιλλος: ἔοικε γοῦν.

Ἀθηναῖος: φέρε δή, πάντων ἀνθρώπων ἐστὶ κοινὸν ἐπιθύμημα ἕν τι τὸ νῦν ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου δηλούμενον, ὡς αὐτός φησιν ὁ λόγος;
Μέγιλλος: τὸ ποῖον;
Ἀθηναῖος: τὸ κατὰ τὴν τῆς αὑτοῦ ψυχῆς ἐπίταξιν τὰ γιγνόμενα γίγνεσθαι, μάλιστα μὲν ἅπαντα, εἰ δὲ μή, τά γε ἀνθρώπινα.
Μέγιλλος: τί μήν;
Ἀθηναῖος: οὐκοῦν ἐπείπερ βουλόμεθα πάντες τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀεί, παῖδές τε ὄντες καὶ ἄνδρες πρεσβῦται, τοῦτ' αὐτὸ καὶ εὐχοίμεθ' ἂν ἀναγκαίως διὰ τέλους;
Μέγιλλος: πῶς δ' οὔ;

Ἀθηναῖος: καὶ μὴν τοῖς γε φίλοις που συνευχοίμεθ' ἂν ταῦτα ἅπερ ἐκεῖνοι ἑαυτοῖσιν.
Μέγιλλος: τί μήν;
Ἀθηναῖος: φίλος μὲν ὑὸς πατρί, παῖς ὢν ἀνδρί.
Μέγιλλος: πῶς δ' οὔ;
Ἀθηναῖος: καὶ μὴν ὧν γ' ὁ παῖς εὔχεται ἑαυτῷ γίγνεσθαι, πολλὰ ὁ πατὴρ ἀπεύξαιτ' ἂν τοῖς θεοῖς μηδαμῶς κατὰ τὰς τοῦ ὑέος εὐχὰς γίγνεσθαι.
Μέγιλλος: ὅταν ἀνόητος ὢν καὶ ἔτι νέος εὔχηται, λέγεις;
Ἀθηναῖος: καὶ ὅταν γε ὁ πατὴρ ὢν γέρων ἢ καὶ σφόδρα νεανίας,

μηδὲν τῶν καλῶν καὶ τῶν δικαίων γιγνώσκων, εὔχηται μάλα προθύμως ἐν παθήμασιν ἀδελφοῖς ὢν τοῖς γενομένοις Θησεῖ πρὸς τὸν δυστυχῶς τελευτήσαντα Ἱππόλυτον, ὁ δὲ παῖς γιγνώσκῃ, τότε, δοκεῖς, παῖς πατρὶ συνεύξεται;
Μέγιλλος: μανθάνω ὃ λέγεις. λέγειν γάρ μοι δοκεῖς ὡς οὐ τοῦτο εὐκτέον οὐδὲ ἐπεικτέον, ἕπεσθαι πάντα τῇ ἑαυτοῦ βουλήσει, τὴν βούλησιν δὲ πολὺ μᾶλλον τῇ ἑαυτοῦ φρονήσει: τοῦτο δὲ καὶ πόλιν καὶ ἕνα ἡμῶν ἕκαστον καὶ εὔχεσθαι δεῖν καὶ σπεύδειν, ὅπως νοῦν ἕξει.

Ἀθηναῖος: ναί, καὶ δὴ καὶ πολιτικόν γε ἄνδρα νομοθέτην ὡς ἀεὶ δεῖ πρὸς τοῦτο βλέποντα τιθέναι τὰς τάξεις τῶν νόμων, αὐτός τε ἐμνήσθην καὶ ὑμᾶς ἐπαναμιμνῄσκω, κατ' ἀρχὰς εἰ μεμνήμεθα τὰ λεχθέντα, ὅτι τὸ μὲν σφῷν ἦν παρακέλευμα ὡς χρεὼν εἴη τὸν ἀγαθὸν νομοθέτην πάντα πολέμου χάριν τὰ νόμιμα τιθέναι, τὸ δὲ ἐμὸν ἔλεγον ὅτι τοῦτο μὲν πρὸς μίαν ἀρετὴν οὐσῶν τεττάρων κελεύοι τίθεσθαι τοὺς νόμους,

δέοι δὲ δὴ πρὸς πᾶσαν μὲν βλέπειν, μάλιστα δὲ καὶ πρὸς πρώτην τὴν τῆς συμπάσης ἡγεμόνα ἀρετῆς, φρόνησις δ' εἴη τοῦτο καὶ νοῦς καὶ δόξα μετ' ἔρωτός τε καὶ ἐπιθυμίας τούτοις ἑπομένης. ἥκει δὴ πάλιν ὁ λόγος εἰς ταὐτόν, καὶ ὁ λέγων ἐγὼ νῦν λέγω πάλιν ἅπερ τότε, εἰ μὲν βούλεσθε, ὡς παίζων, εἰ δ', ὡς σπουδάζων, ὅτι δή φημι εὐχῇ χρῆσθαι σφαλερὸν εἶναι νοῦν μὴ κεκτημένον, ἀλλὰ τἀναντία ταῖς βουλήσεσίν

οἱ γίγνεσθαι. σπουδάζοντα δ' εἴ με τιθέναι βούλεσθε, τίθετε: πάνυ γὰρ οὖν προσδοκῶ νῦν ὑμᾶς εὑρήσειν, τῷ λόγῳ ἑπομένους ὃν ὀλίγον ἔμπροσθε προυθέμεθα, τῆς τῶν βασιλέων τε φθορᾶς καὶ ὅλου τοῦ διανοήματος οὐ δειλίαν οὖσαν τὴν αἰτίαν, οὐδ' ὅτι τὰ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον οὐκ ἠπίσταντο ἄρχοντές τε καὶ οὓς προσῆκεν ἄρχεσθαι, τῇ λοιπῇ δὲ πάσῃ κακίᾳ διεφθαρμένα, καὶ μάλιστα τῇ περὶ τὰ μέγιστα τῶν

ἀνθρωπίνων πραγμάτων ἀμαθίᾳ. ταῦτ' οὖν ὡς οὕτω γέγονε περὶ τὰ τότε, καὶ νῦν, εἴ που, γίγνεται, καὶ ἐς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον οὐκ ἄλλως συμβήσεται, ἐὰν βούλησθε, πειράσομαι ἰὼν κατὰ τὸν ἑξῆς λόγον ἀνευρίσκειν τε καὶ ὑμῖν δηλοῦν κατὰ δύναμιν ὡς οὖσιν φίλοις.
Κλεινίας: λόγῳ μὲν τοίνυν σε, ὦ ξένε, ἐπαινεῖν ἐπαχθέστερον, ἔργῳ δὲ σφόδρα ἐπαινεσόμεθα: προθύμως γὰρ τοῖς λεγομένοις ἐπακολουθήσομεν, ἐν οἷς ὅ γε ἐλεύθερος ἐπαινῶν καὶ μὴ μάλιστ' ἐστὶν καταφανής.

Μέγιλλος: ἄριστ', ὦ Κλεινία, καὶ ποιῶμεν ἃ λέγεις.
Κλεινίας: ἔσται ταῦτα, ἐὰν θεὸς ἐθέλῃ. λέγε μόνον.
Ἀθηναῖος: φαμὲν δή νυν, καθ' ὁδὸν ἰόντες τὴν λοιπὴν τοῦ λόγου, τὴν μεγίστην ἀμαθίαν τότε ἐκείνην τὴν δύναμιν ἀπολέσαι καὶ νῦν ταὐτὸν τοῦτο πεφυκέναι ποιεῖν, ὥστε τόν γε νομοθέτην, εἰ τοῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει, πειρατέον ταῖς πόλεσιν φρόνησιν μὲν ὅσην δυνατὸν ἐμποιεῖν, τὴν δ' ἄνοιαν ὅτι μάλιστα ἐξαιρεῖν.
Κλεινίας: δῆλον.

Ἀθηναῖος: τίς οὖν ἡ μεγίστη δικαίως ἂν λέγοιτο ἀμαθία; σκοπεῖτε εἰ συνδόξει καὶ σφῷν λεγόμενον: ἐγὼ μὲν δὴ τὴν τοιάνδε τίθεμαι.
Κλεινίας: ποίαν;
Ἀθηναῖος: τὴν ὅταν τῴ τι δόξαν καλὸν ἢ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι μὴ φιλῇ τοῦτο ἀλλὰ μισῇ, τὸ δὲ πονηρὸν καὶ ἄδικον δοκοῦν εἶναι φιλῇ τε καὶ ἀσπάζηται. ταύτην τὴν διαφωνίαν λύπης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς πρὸς τὴν κατὰ λόγον δόξαν ἀμαθίαν φημὶ εἶναι τὴν ἐσχάτην, μεγίστην δέ, ὅτι τοῦ πλήθους ἐστὶ τῆς ψυχῆς:

τὸ γὰρ λυπούμενον καὶ ἡδόμενον αὐτῆς ὅπερ δῆμός τε καὶ πλῆθος πόλεώς ἐστιν. ὅταν οὖν ἐπιστήμαις ἢ δόξαις ἢ λόγῳ ἐναντιῶται, τοῖς φύσει ἀρχικοῖς, ἡ ψυχή, τοῦτο ἄνοιαν προσαγορεύω, πόλεώς τε, ὅταν ἄρχουσιν καὶ νόμοις μὴ πείθηται τὸ πλῆθος, ταὐτόν, καὶ δὴ καὶ ἑνὸς ἀνδρός, ὁπόταν καλοὶ ἐν ψυχῇ λόγοι ἐνόντες μηδὲν ποιῶσιν πλέον ἀλλὰ δὴ τούτοις πᾶν τοὐναντίον, ταύτας πάσας ἀμαθίας τὰς πλημμελεστάτας

ἔγωγ' ἂν θείην πόλεώς τε καὶ ἑνὸς ἑκάστου τῶν πολιτῶν, ἀλλ' οὐ τὰς τῶν δημιουργῶν, εἰ ἄρα μου καταμανθάνετε, ὦ ξένοι, ὃ λέγω.
Κλεινίας: μανθάνομέν τε, ὦ φίλε, καὶ συγχωροῦμεν ἃ λέγεις.
Ἀθηναῖος: τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν οὕτω κείσθω δεδογμένον καὶ λεγόμενον, ὡς τοῖς ταῦτ' ἀμαθαίνουσι τῶν πολιτῶν οὐδὲν ἐπιτρεπτέον ἀρχῆς ἐχόμενον καὶ ὡς ἀμαθέσιν ὀνειδιστέον, ἂν καὶ πάνυ λογιστικοί τε ὦσι καὶ πάντα τὰ κομψὰ καὶ ὅσα

πρὸς τάχος τῆς ψυχῆς πεφυκότα διαπεπονημένοι ἅπαντα, τοὺς δὲ τοὐναντίον ἔχοντας τούτων ὡς σοφούς τε προσρητέον, ἂν καὶ τὸ λεγόμενον μήτε γράμματα μήτε νεῖν ἐπίστωνται, καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς δοτέον ὡς ἔμφροσιν. πῶς γὰρ ἄν, ὦ φίλοι, ἄνευ συμφωνίας γένοιτ' ἂν φρονήσεως καὶ τὸ σμικρότατον εἶδος; οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλ' ἡ καλλίστη καὶ μεγίστη τῶν συμφωνιῶν μεγίστη δικαιότατ' ἂν λέγοιτο σοφία, ἧς ὁ μὲν κατὰ λόγον ζῶν μέτοχος, ὁ δὲ ἀπολειπόμενος οἰκοφθόρος καὶ περὶ πόλιν οὐδαμῇ σωτὴρ ἀλλὰ πᾶν τοὐναντίον ἀμαθαίνων εἰς ταῦτα

ἑκάστοτε φανεῖται. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν, καθάπερ εἴπομεν ἄρτι, λελεγμένα τεθήτω ταύτῃ.
Κλεινίας: κείσθω γὰρ οὖν.
Ἀθηναῖος: ἄρχοντας δὲ δὴ καὶ ἀρχομένους ἀναγκαῖον ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν εἶναί που.
Κλεινίας: τί μήν;

Ἀθηναῖος: εἶεν: ἀξιώματα δὲ δὴ τοῦ τε ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι ποῖά ἐστι καὶ πόσα, ἔν τε πόλεσιν μεγάλαις καὶ σμικραῖς ἔν τε οἰκίαις ὡσαύτως; ἆρ' οὐχὶ ἓν μὲν τό τε πατρὸς καὶ μητρός; καὶ ὅλως γονέας ἐκγόνων ἄρχειν ἀξίωμα ὀρθὸν πανταχοῦ ἂν εἴη;
Κλεινίας: καὶ μάλα.
Ἀθηναῖος: τούτῳ δέ γε ἑπόμενον γενναίους ἀγεννῶν ἄρχειν: καὶ τρίτον ἔτι τούτοις συνέπεται τὸ πρεσβυτέρους μὲν ἄρχειν δεῖν, νεωτέρους δὲ ἄρχεσθαι.
Κλεινίας: τί μήν;

Ἀθηναῖος: τέταρτον δ' αὖ δούλους μὲν ἄρχεσθαι, δεσπότας δὲ ἄρχειν.
Κλεινίας: πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
Ἀθηναῖος: πέμπτον γε οἶμαι τὸ κρείττονα μὲν ἄρχειν, τὸν ἥττω δὲ ἄρχεσθαι.
Κλεινίας: μάλα γε ἀναγκαῖον ἀρχὴν εἴρηκας.
Ἀθηναῖος: καὶ πλείστην γε ἐν σύμπασιν τοῖς ζῴοις οὖσαν καὶ κατὰ φύσιν, ὡς ὁ Θηβαῖος ἔφη ποτὲ Πίνδαρος. τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀξίωμα ἕκτον ἂν γίγνοιτο, ἕπεσθαι μὲν τὸν ἀνεπιστήμονα κελεῦον, τὸν δὲ φρονοῦντα ἡγεῖσθαί τε καὶ

ἄρχειν. καίτοι τοῦτό γε, ὦ Πίνδαρε σοφώτατε, σχεδὸν οὐκ ἂν παρὰ φύσιν ἔγωγε φαίην γίγνεσθαι, κατὰ φύσιν δέ, τὴν τοῦ νόμου ἑκόντων ἀρχὴν ἀλλ' οὐ βίαιον πεφυκυῖαν.
Κλεινίας: ὀρθότατα λέγεις.
Ἀθηναῖος: θεοφιλῆ δέ γε καὶ εὐτυχῆ τινα λέγοντες ἑβδόμην ἀρχήν, εἰς κλῆρόν τινα προάγομεν, καὶ λαχόντα μὲν ἄρχειν, δυσκληροῦντα δὲ ἀπιόντα ἄρχεσθαι τὸ δικαιότατον εἶναί φαμεν.
Κλεινίας: ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

Ἀθηναῖος: “ὁρᾷς δή,” φαῖμεν ἄν, “ὦ νομοθέτα,” πρός τινα παίζοντες τῶν ἐπὶ νόμων θέσιν ἰόντων ῥᾳδίως, “ὅσα ἐστὶ πρὸς ἄρχοντας ἀξιώματα, καὶ ὅτι πεφυκότα πρὸς ἄλληλα ἐναντίως; νῦν γὰρ δὴ στάσεων πηγήν τινα ἀνηυρήκαμεν ἡμεῖς, ἣν δεῖ σε θεραπεύειν. πρῶτον δὲ μεθ' ἡμῶν ἀνάσκεψαι πῶς τε καὶ τί παρὰ ταῦτα ἁμαρτόντες οἱ περί τε Ἄργος καὶ Μεσσήνην βασιλῆς αὑτοὺς ἅμα καὶ τὴν τῶν Ἑλλήνων δύναμιν,

οὖσαν θαυμαστὴν ἐν τῷ τότε χρόνῳ, διέφθειραν. ἆρ' οὐκ ἀγνοήσαντες τὸν Ἡσίοδον ὀρθότατα λέγοντα ὡς τὸ ἥμισυ τοῦ παντὸς πολλάκις ἐστὶ πλέον; ὁπόταν ᾖ τὸ μὲν ὅλον λαμβάνειν ζημιῶδες, τὸ δ' ἥμισυ μέτριον, τότε τὸ μέτριον τοῦ ἀμέτρου πλέον ἡγήσατο, ἄμεινον ὂν χείρονος.”
Κλεινίας: ὀρθότατά γε.
Ἀθηναῖος: πότερον οὖν οἰόμεθα περὶ βασιλέας τοῦτ' ἐγγιγνόμενον ἑκάστοτε διαφθείρειν πρότερον, ἢ ἐν τοῖσιν δήμοις;

Κλεινίας: τὸ μὲν εἰκὸς καὶ τὸ πολύ, βασιλέων τοῦτ' εἶναι νόσημα ὑπερηφάνως ζώντων διὰ τρυφάς.
Ἀθηναῖος: οὐκοῦν δῆλον ὡς πρῶτον τοῦτο οἱ τότε βασιλῆς ἔσχον, τὸ πλεονεκτεῖν τῶν τεθέντων νόμων, καὶ ὃ λόγῳ τε καὶ ὅρκῳ ἐπῄνεσαν, οὐ συνεφώνησαν αὑτοῖς, ἀλλὰ ἡ διαφωνία, ὡς ἡμεῖς φαμεν, οὖσα ἀμαθία μεγίστη, δοκοῦσα δὲ σοφία, πάντ' ἐκεῖνα διὰ πλημμέλειαν καὶ ἀμουσίαν τὴν πικρὰν διέφθειρεν;
Κλεινίας: ἔοικε γοῦν.

Ἀθηναῖος: εἶεν: τί δὴ τὸν νομοθέτην ἔδει τότε τιθέντα εὐλαβηθῆναι τούτου περὶ τοῦ πάθους τῆς γενέσεως; ἆρ' ὦ πρὸς θεῶν νῦν μὲν οὐδὲν σοφὸν γνῶναι τοῦτο οὐδ' εἰπεῖν χαλεπόν, εἰ δὲ προϊδεῖν ἦν τότε, σοφώτερος ἂν ἦν ἡμῶν ὁ προϊδών;
Μέγιλλος: τὸ ποῖον δὴ λέγεις;
Ἀθηναῖος: εἰς τὸ γεγονὸς παρ' ὑμῖν, ὦ Μέγιλλε, ἔστιν νῦν γε κατιδόντα γνῶναι, καὶ γνόντα εἰπεῖν ῥᾴδιον, ὃ τότε ἔδει γίγνεσθαι.
Μέγιλλος: σαφέστερον ἔτι λέγε.
Ἀθηναῖος: τὸ τοίνυν σαφέστατον ἂν εἴη τὸ τοιόνδε.
Μέγιλλος: τὸ ποῖον;

Ἀθηναῖος: ἐάν τις μείζονα διδῷ τοῖς ἐλάττοσι [δύναμιν] παρεὶς τὸ μέτριον, πλοίοις τε ἱστία καὶ σώμασιν τροφὴν καὶ ψυχαῖς ἀρχάς, ἀνατρέπεταί που πάντα, καὶ ἐξυβρίζοντα τὰ μὲν εἰς νόσους θεῖ, τὰ δ' εἰς ἔκγονον ὕβρεως ἀδικίαν. τί οὖν δή ποτε λέγομεν; ἆρά γε τὸ τοιόνδε, ὡς οὐκ ἔστ', ὦ φίλοι ἄνδρες, θνητῆς ψυχῆς φύσις ἥτις ποτὲ δυνήσεται τὴν μεγίστην ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀρχὴν φέρειν νέα καὶ ἀνυπεύθυνος,

ὥστε μὴ τῆς μεγίστης νόσου ἀνοίας πληρωθεῖσα αὑτῆς τὴν διάνοιαν, μῖσος ἔχειν πρὸς τῶν ἐγγύτατα φίλων, ὃ γενόμενον ταχὺ διέφθειρεν αὐτὴν καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν δύναμιν ἠφάνισεν αὐτῆς; τοῦτ' οὖν εὐλαβηθῆναι γνόντας τὸ μέτριον μεγάλων νομοθετῶν. ὡς οὖν δὴ τότε γενόμενον, νῦν ἔστιν μετριώτατα τοπάσαι: τὸ δ' ἔοικεν εἶναι—
Μέγιλλος: τὸ ποῖον;
Ἀθηναῖος: θεὸς εἶναι κηδόμενος ὑμῶν τις, ὃς τὰ μέλλοντα προορῶν, δίδυμον ὑμῖν φυτεύσας τὴν τῶν βασιλέων γένεσιν

ἐκ μονογενοῦς, εἰς τὸ μέτριον μᾶλλον συνέστειλε. καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο ἔτι φύσις τις ἀνθρωπίνη μεμειγμένη θείᾳ τινὶ δυνάμει, κατιδοῦσα ὑμῶν τὴν ἀρχὴν φλεγμαίνουσαν ἔτι, μείγνυσιν τὴν

κατὰ γῆρας σώφρονα δύναμιν τῇ κατὰ γένος αὐθάδει ῥώμῃ, τὴν τῶν ὀκτὼ καὶ εἴκοσι γερόντων ἰσόψηφον εἰς τὰ μέγιστα τῇ τῶν βασιλέων ποιήσασα δυνάμει. ὁ δὲ τρίτος σωτὴρ ὑμῖν ἔτι σπαργῶσαν καὶ θυμουμένην τὴν ἀρχὴν ὁρῶν, οἷον ψάλιον ἐνέβαλεν αὐτῇ τὴν τῶν ἐφόρων δύναμιν, ἐγγὺς τῆς κληρωτῆς ἀγαγὼν δυνάμεως: καὶ κατὰ δὴ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἡ βασιλεία παρ' ὑμῖν, ἐξ ὧν ἔδει σύμμεικτος γενομένη καὶ μέτρον ἔχουσα, σωθεῖσα αὐτὴ σωτηρίας τοῖς ἄλλοις γέγονεν

αἰτία. ἐπεὶ ἐπί γε Τημένῳ καὶ Κρεσφόντῃ καὶ τοῖς τότε νομοθέταις, οἵτινες ἄρα ἦσαν νομοθετοῦντες, οὐδ' ἡ Ἀριστοδήμου μερὶς ἐσώθη ποτ' ἄν—οὐ γὰρ ἱκανῶς ἦσαν νομοθεσίας ἔμπειροι: σχεδὸν γὰρ οὐκ ἄν ποτ' ᾠήθησαν ὅρκοις μετριάσαι ψυχὴν νέαν, λαβοῦσαν ἀρχὴν ἐξ ἧς δυνατὸν ἦν τυραννίδα γενέσθαι—νῦν δ' ὁ θεὸς ἔδειξεν οἵαν ἔδει καὶ δεῖ δὴ τὴν μενοῦσαν μάλιστα ἀρχὴν γίγνεσθαι. τὸ δὲ παρ'

ἡμῶν γιγνώσκεσθαι ταῦτα, ὅπερ εἶπον ἔμπροσθεν, νῦν μὲν γενόμενον οὐδὲν σοφόν—ἐκ γὰρ παραδείγματος ὁρᾶν γεγονότος οὐδὲν χαλεπόν—εἰ δ' ἦν τις προορῶν τότε ταῦτα καὶ δυνάμενος μετριάσαι τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ μίαν ἐκ τριῶν ποιῆσαι, τά τε νοηθέντα ἂν καλὰ τότε πάντα ἀπέσωσε καὶ οὐκ ἄν ποτε ὁ Περσικὸς ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα οὐδ' ἄλλος οὐδεὶς στόλος ἂν ὥρμησε, καταφρονήσας ὡς ὄντων ἡμῶν βραχέος ἀξίων.
Κλεινίας: ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

Ἀθηναῖος: αἰσχρῶς γοῦν ἠμύναντο αὐτούς, ὦ Κλεινία. τὸ δ' αἰσχρὸν λέγω οὐχ ὡς οὐ νικῶντές γε οἱ τότε καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν καλὰς νενικήκασι μάχας: ἀλλὰ ὅ φημι αἰσχρὸν τότ' εἶναι, τόδε λέγω, τὸ πρῶτον μὲν ἐκείνων τῶν πόλεων τριῶν οὐσῶν μίαν ὑπὲρ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἀμῦναι, τὼ δὲ δύο κακῶς οὕτως εἶναι διεφθαρμένα, ὥστε ἡ μὲν καὶ Λακεδαίμονα διεκώλυεν ἐπαμύνειν αὐτῇ, πολεμοῦσα αὐτῇ κατὰ κράτος, ἡ δ' αὖ πρωτεύουσα ἐν τοῖς τότε χρόνοις τοῖς

περὶ τὴν διανομήν, ἡ περὶ τὸ Ἄργος, παρακαλουμένη ἀμύνειν τὸν βάρβαρον οὔθ' ὑπήκουσεν οὔτ' ἤμυνεν. πολλὰ δὲ λέγων ἄν τις τὰ τότε γενόμενα περὶ ἐκεῖνον τὸν πόλεμον, τῆς Ἑλλάδος οὐδαμῶς εὐσχήμονα ἂν κατηγοροῖ: οὐδ' αὖ ἀμύνασθαι τήν γε Ἑλλάδα λέγων ὀρθῶς ἂν λέγοι, ἀλλ' εἰ μὴ τό τε Ἀθηναίων καὶ τὸ Λακεδαιμονίων κοινῇ διανόημα

ἤμυνεν τὴν ἐπιοῦσαν δουλείαν, σχεδὸν ἂν ἤδη πάντ' ἦν μεμειγμένα τὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων γένη ἐν ἀλλήλοις, καὶ βάρβαρα ἐν Ἕλλησι καὶ Ἑλληνικὰ ἐν βαρβάροις, καθάπερ ὧν Πέρσαι τυραννοῦσι τὰ νῦν διαπεφορημένα καὶ συμπεφορημένα κακῶς ἐσπαρμένα κατοικεῖται. ταῦτ', ὦ Κλεινία καὶ Μέγιλλε, ἔχομεν ἐπιτιμᾶν τοῖς τε πάλαι πολιτικοῖς λεγομένοις καὶ νομοθέταις καὶ τοῖς νῦν, ἵνα τὰς αἰτίας αὐτῶν ἀναζητοῦντες,

ἀνευρίσκωμεν τί παρὰ ταῦτα ἔδει πράττειν ἄλλο: οἷον δὴ καὶ τὸ παρὸν εἴπομεν, ὡς ἄρα οὐ δεῖ μεγάλας ἀρχὰς οὐδ' αὖ ἀμείκτους νομοθετεῖν, διανοηθέντας τὸ τοιόνδε, ὅτι πόλιν ἐλευθέραν τε εἶναι δεῖ καὶ ἔμφρονα καὶ ἑαυτῇ φίλην, καὶ τὸν νομοθετοῦντα πρὸς ταῦτα βλέποντα δεῖ νομοθετεῖν. μὴ θαυμάσωμεν δὲ εἰ πολλάκις ἤδη προθέμενοι ἄττα, εἰρήκαμεν ὅτι πρὸς ταῦτα δεῖ νομοθετεῖν βλέποντα τὸν νομοθέτην,

τὰ δὲ προτεθέντα οὐ ταὐτὰ ἡμῖν φαίνεται ἑκάστοτε: ἀλλὰ ἀναλογίζεσθαι χρή, ὅταν πρὸς τὸ σωφρονεῖν φῶμεν δεῖν βλέπειν, ἢ πρὸς φρόνησιν ἢ φιλίαν, ὡς ἔσθ' οὗτος ὁ σκοπὸς οὐχ ἕτερος ἀλλ' ὁ αὐτός, καὶ ἄλλα δὴ πολλὰ ἡμᾶς τοιαῦτα ἂν γίγνηται ῥήματα μὴ διαταραττέτω.
Κλεινίας: πειρασόμεθα ποιεῖν οὕτως ἐπανιόντες τοὺς λόγους: καὶ νῦν δὴ τὸ περὶ τῆς φιλίας τε καὶ φρονήσεως καὶ ἐλευθερίας, πρὸς ὅτι βουλόμενος ἔμελλες λέγειν δεῖν στοχάζεσθαι

τὸν νομοθέτην, λέγε.
Ἀθηναῖος: ἄκουσον δή νυν. εἰσὶν πολιτειῶν οἷον μητέρες δύο τινές, ἐξ ὧν τὰς ἄλλας γεγονέναι λέγων ἄν τις ὀρθῶς λέγοι, καὶ τὴν μὲν προσαγορεύειν μοναρχίαν ὀρθόν, τὴν δ' αὖ δημοκρατίαν, καὶ τῆς μὲν τὸ Περσῶν γένος ἄκρον ἔχειν, τῆς δὲ ἡμᾶς: αἱ δ' ἄλλαι σχεδὸν ἅπασαι, καθάπερ εἶπον, ἐκ τούτων εἰσὶ διαπεποικιλμέναι. δεῖ δὴ οὖν καὶ ἀναγκαῖον μεταλαβεῖν ἀμφοῖν τούτοιν, εἴπερ ἐλευθερία τ' ἔσται καὶ

φιλία μετὰ φρονήσεως: ὃ δὴ βούλεται ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος προστάττειν, λέγων ὡς οὐκ ἄν ποτε τούτων πόλις ἄμοιρος γενομένη πολιτευθῆναι δύναιτ' ἂν καλῶς.
Κλεινίας: πῶς γὰρ ἄν;
Ἀθηναῖος: ἡ μὲν τοίνυν τὸ μοναρχικόν, ἡ δὲ τὸ ἐλεύθερον ἀγαπήσασα μειζόνως ἢ ἔδει μόνον, οὐδετέρα τὰ μέτρια κέκτηται τούτων, αἱ δὲ ὑμέτεραι, ἥ τε Λακωνικὴ καὶ Κρητική, μᾶλλον: Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ καὶ Πέρσαι τὸ μὲν πάλαι οὕτω

πως, τὸ νῦν δὲ ἧττον. τὰ δ' αἴτια διέλθωμεν: ἦ γάρ;
Κλεινίας: πάντως, εἴ γέ που μέλλομεν ὃ προυθέμεθα περαίνειν.
Ἀθηναῖος: ἀκούωμεν δή. Πέρσαι γάρ, ὅτε μὲν τὸ μέτριον μᾶλλον δουλείας τε καὶ ἐλευθερίας ἦγον ἐπὶ Κύρου, πρῶτον μὲν ἐλεύθεροι ἐγένοντο, ἔπειτα δὲ ἄλλων πολλῶν δεσπόται. ἐλευθερίας γὰρ ἄρχοντες μεταδιδόντες ἀρχομένοις καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ ἴσον ἄγοντες, μᾶλλον φίλοι τε ἦσαν στρατιῶται στρατηγοῖς

καὶ προθύμους αὑτοὺς ἐν τοῖς κινδύνοις παρείχοντο: καὶ εἴ τις αὖ φρόνιμος ἦν ἐν αὐτοῖς καὶ βουλεύειν δυνατός, οὐ φθονεροῦ τοῦ βασιλέως ὄντος, διδόντος δὲ παρρησίαν καὶ τιμῶντος τοὺς εἴς τι δυναμένους συμβουλεύειν, κοινὴν τὴν τοῦ φρονεῖν εἰς τὸ μέσον παρείχετο δύναμιν, καὶ πάντα δὴ τότε ἐπέδωκεν αὐτοῖς δι' ἐλευθερίαν τε καὶ φιλίαν καὶ νοῦ κοινωνίαν.
Κλεινίας: ἔοικέν γέ πως τὰ λεγόμενα οὕτω γεγονέναι.

Ἀθηναῖος: πῇ δὴ οὖν ποτε ἀπώλετο ἐπὶ Καμβύσου καὶ πάλιν ἐπὶ Δαρείου σχεδὸν ἐσώθη; βούλεσθε οἷον μαντείᾳ διανοηθέντες χρώμεθα;
Κλεινίας: φέρει γοῦν ἡμῖν σκέψιν τοῦτο ἐφ' ὅπερ ὡρμήκαμεν.
Ἀθηναῖος: μαντεύομαι δὴ νῦν περί γε Κύρου, τὰ μὲν ἄλλ' αὐτὸν στρατηγόν τε ἀγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ φιλόπολιν, παιδείας δὲ ὀρθῆς οὐχ ἧφθαι τὸ παράπαν, οἰκονομίᾳ τε οὐδὲν τὸν νοῦν προσεσχηκέναι.
Κλεινίας: πῶς δὴ τὸ τοιοῦτον φῶμεν;

Ἀθηναῖος: ἔοικεν ἐκ νέου στρατεύεσθαι διὰ βίου, ταῖς γυναιξὶν παραδοὺς τοὺς παῖδας τρέφειν. αἱ δὲ ὡς εὐδαίμονας αὐτοὺς ἐκ τῶν παίδων εὐθὺς καὶ μακαρίους ἤδη γεγονότας καὶ ἐπιδεεῖς ὄντας τούτων οὐδενὸς ἔτρεφον: κωλύουσαι δὲ ὡς οὖσιν ἱκανῶς εὐδαίμοσιν μήτε αὐτοῖς ἐναντιοῦσθαι μηδένα εἰς μηδέν, ἐπαινεῖν τε ἀναγκάζουσαι πάντας τὸ λεγόμενον ἢ πραττόμενον ὑπ' αὐτῶν, ἔθρεψαν τοιούτους τινάς.
Κλεινίας: καλήν, ὡς ἔοικας, τροφὴν εἴρηκας.

Ἀθηναῖος: γυναικείαν μὲν οὖν βασιλίδων γυναικῶν νεωστὶ γεγονυιῶν πλουσίων, καὶ ἐν ἀνδρῶν ἐρημίᾳ, διὰ τὸ μὴ σχολάζειν ὑπὸ πολέμων καὶ πολλῶν κινδύνων, τοὺς παῖδας τρεφουσῶν.
Κλεινίας: ἔχει γὰρ λόγον.
Ἀθηναῖος: ὁ δὲ πατήρ γε αὐτοῖς αὖ ποίμνια μὲν καὶ πρόβατα καὶ ἀγέλας ἀνδρῶν τε καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν πολλὰς ἐκτᾶτο,

αὐτοὺς δὲ οἷς ταῦτα παραδώσειν ἔμελλεν ἠγνόει τὴν πατρῴαν οὐ παιδευομένους τέχνην, οὖσαν Περσικήν—ποιμένων ὄντων Περσῶν, τραχείας χώρας ἐκγόνων—σκληρὰν καὶ ἱκανὴν ποιμένας ἀπεργάζεσθαι μάλα ἰσχυροὺς καὶ δυναμένους θυραυλεῖν καὶ ἀγρυπνεῖν καὶ εἰ στρατεύεσθαι δέοι στρατεύεσθαι: διεφθαρμένην δὲ παιδείαν ὑπὸ τῆς λεγομένης εὐδαιμονίας τὴν Μηδικὴν περιεῖδεν ὑπὸ γυναικῶν τε καὶ εὐνούχων παιδευθέντας

αὑτοῦ τοὺς ὑεῖς, ὅθεν ἐγένοντο οἵους ἦν αὐτοὺς εἰκὸς γενέσθαι, τροφῇ ἀνεπιπλήκτῳ τραφέντας. παραλαβόντες δ' οὖν οἱ παῖδες τελευτήσαντος Κύρου τρυφῆς μεστοὶ καὶ ἀνεπιπληξίας, πρῶτον μὲν τὸν ἕτερον ἅτερος ἀπέκτεινε τῷ ἴσῳ ἀγανακτῶν, μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο αὐτὸς μαινόμενος ὑπὸ μέθης τε καὶ ἀπαιδευσίας τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀπώλεσεν ὑπὸ Μήδων τε καὶ τοῦ λεγομένου τότε εὐνούχου, καταφρονήσαντος τῆς Καμβύσου μωρίας.

Κλεινίας: λέγεται δὴ ταῦτά γε, καὶ ἔοικεν σχεδὸν οὕτω πως γεγονέναι.
Ἀθηναῖος: καὶ μὴν καὶ πάλιν εἰς Πέρσας ἐλθεῖν τὴν ἀρχὴν διὰ Δαρείου καὶ τῶν ἑπτὰ λέγεταί που.
Κλεινίας: τί μήν;
Ἀθηναῖος: θεωρῶμεν δὴ συνεπόμενοι τῷ λόγῳ. Δαρεῖος γὰρ βασιλέως οὐκ ἦν ὑός, παιδείᾳ τε οὐ διατρυφώσῃ τεθραμμένος, ἐλθὼν δ' εἰς τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ λαβὼν αὐτὴν ἕβδομος, διείλετο ἑπτὰ μέρη τεμόμενος, ὧν καὶ νῦν ἔτι σμικρὰ ὀνείρατα λέλειπται, καὶ νόμους ἠξίου θέμενος οἰκεῖν ἰσότητα

κοινήν τινα εἰσφέρων, καὶ τὸν τοῦ Κύρου δασμόν, ὃν ὑπέσχετο Πέρσαις, εἰς τὸν νόμον ἐνέδει, φιλίαν πορίζων καὶ κοινωνίαν πᾶσιν Πέρσαις, χρήμασι καὶ δωρεαῖς τὸν Περσῶν δῆμον προσαγόμενος: τοιγαροῦν αὐτῷ τὰ στρατεύματα μετ' εὐνοίας προσεκτήσατο χώρας οὐκ ἐλάττους ὧν κατέλιπε Κῦρος. μετὰ δὲ Δαρεῖον ὁ τῇ βασιλικῇ καὶ τρυφώσῃ πάλιν παιδευθεὶς παιδείᾳ Ξέρξης— “ὦ Δαρεῖε,” εἰπεῖν ἐστιν δικαιότατον ἴσως, “ὃς τὸ Κύρου κακὸν οὐκ

ἔμαθες, ἐθρέψω δὲ Ξέρξην ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἤθεσιν ἐν οἷσπερ Κῦρος Καμβύσην” —ὁ δέ, ἅτε τῶν αὐτῶν παιδειῶν γενόμενος ἔκγονος, παραπλήσια ἀπετέλεσεν τοῖς Καμβύσου παθήμασιν: καὶ σχεδὸν ἔκ γε τοσούτου βασιλεὺς ἐν Πέρσαις οὐδείς πω μέγας ἐγγέγονεν ἀληθῶς, πλήν γε ὀνόματι. τὸ δ' αἴτιον οὐ τύχης, ὡς ὁ ἐμὸς λόγος, ἀλλ' ὁ κακὸς βίος ὃν οἱ τῶν

διαφερόντως πλουσίων καὶ τυράννων παῖδες τὰ πολλὰ ζῶσιν: οὐ γὰρ μή ποτε γένηται παῖς καὶ ἀνὴρ καὶ γέρων ἐκ ταύτης τῆς τροφῆς διαφέρων πρὸς ἀρετήν. ἃ δή, φαμέν, τῷ νομοθέτῃ σκεπτέον, καὶ ἡμῖν δὲ ἐν τῷ νῦν παρόντι. δίκαιον μήν, ὦ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, τοῦτό γε τῇ πόλει ὑμῶν ἀποδιδόναι, ὅτι πενίᾳ καὶ πλούτῳ καὶ ἰδιωτείᾳ καὶ βασιλείᾳ διαφέρουσαν οὐδ' ἡντινοῦν τιμὴν καὶ τροφὴν νέμετε, ἃς μὴ τὸ κατ' ἀρχὰς

ὑμῖν θεῖον παρὰ θεοῦ διεμαντεύσατό τινος. οὐ γὰρ δὴ δεῖ κατὰ πόλιν γε εἶναι τὰς τιμὰς ὑπερεχούσας, ὅτι τίς ἐστιν πλούτῳ διαφέρων, ἐπεὶ οὐδ' ὅτι ταχὺς ἢ καλὸς ἢ ἰσχυρὸς ἄνευ τινὸς ἀρετῆς, οὐδ' ἀρετῆς ἧς ἂν σωφροσύνη ἀπῇ.
Μέγιλλος: πῶς τοῦτο, ὦ ξένε, λέγεις;
Ἀθηναῖος: ἀνδρεία που μόριον ἀρετῆς ἕν;
Μέγιλλος: πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
Ἀθηναῖος: δίκασον τοίνυν αὐτὸς τὸν λόγον ἀκούσας εἴ σοι δέξαι' ἂν σύνοικον ἢ γείτονα εἶναί τινα σφόδρα μὲν ἀνδρεῖον, μὴ σώφρονα δὲ ἀλλ' ἀκόλαστον.

Μέγιλλος: εὐφήμει.
Ἀθηναῖος: τί δέ; τεχνικὸν μὲν καὶ περὶ ταῦτα σοφόν, ἄδικον δέ;
Μέγιλλος: οὐδαμῶς.
Ἀθηναῖος: ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε δίκαιον οὐ φύεται χωρὶς τοῦ σωφρονεῖν.
Μέγιλλος: πῶς γὰρ ἄν;
Ἀθηναῖος: οὐδὲ μὴν ὅν γε σοφὸν ἡμεῖς νυνδὴ προυθέμεθα, τὸν τὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας κεκτημένον συμφώνους τοῖς ὀρθοῖς λόγοις καὶ ἑπομένας.
Μέγιλλος: οὐ γὰρ οὖν.
Ἀθηναῖος: ἔτι δὴ καὶ τόδε ἐπισκεψώμεθα τῶν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν

τιμήσεων ἕνεκα, ποῖαί τε ὀρθαὶ καὶ μὴ γίγνονται ἑκάστοτε.
Μέγιλλος: τὸ ποῖον;
Ἀθηναῖος: σωφροσύνη ἄνευ πάσης τῆς ἄλλης ἀρετῆς ἐν ψυχῇ τινι μεμονωμένη τίμιον ἢ ἄτιμον γίγνοιτ' ἂν κατὰ δίκην;
Μέγιλλος: οὐκ ἔχω ὅπως εἴπω.
Ἀθηναῖος: καὶ μὴν εἴρηκάς γε μετρίως: εἰπὼν γὰρ δὴ ὧν ἠρόμην ὁποτερονοῦν, παρὰ μέλος ἔμοιγ' ἂν δοκεῖς φθέγξασθαι.
Μέγιλλος: καλῶς τοίνυν γεγονὸς ἂν εἴη.
Ἀθηναῖος: εἶεν: τὸ μὲν δὴ πρόσθημα ὧν τιμαί τε καὶ ἀτιμίαι

οὐ λόγου, ἀλλά τινος μᾶλλον ἀλόγου σιγῆς, ἄξιον ἂν εἴη.
Μέγιλλος: σωφροσύνην μοι φαίνῃ λέγειν.
Ἀθηναῖος: ναί. τὸ δέ γε τῶν ἄλλων πλεῖστα ἡμᾶς ὠφελοῦν μετὰ τῆς προσθήκης μάλιστ' ἂν τιμώμενον ὀρθότατα τιμῷτο, καὶ τὸ δεύτερον δευτέρως: καὶ οὕτω δὴ κατὰ τὸν ἑξῆς λόγον τὰς ἐφεξῆς τιμὰς λαγχάνον ἕκαστον ὀρθῶς ἂν λαγχάνοι.

Μέγιλλος: ἔχει ταύτῃ.
Ἀθηναῖος: τί οὖν; οὐ νομοθέτου καὶ ταῦτα αὖ φήσομεν εἶναι διανέμειν;
Μέγιλλος: καὶ μάλα.
Ἀθηναῖος: βούλει δὴ τὰ μὲν ἅπαντα καὶ ἐφ' ἕκαστον ἔργον καὶ κατὰ σμικρὰ ἐκείνῳ δῶμεν νεῖμαι, τὸ δὲ τριχῇ διελεῖν, ἐπειδὴ νόμων ἐσμὲν καὶ αὐτοί πως ἐπιθυμηταί, πειραθῶμεν, διατεμεῖν χωρὶς τά τε μέγιστα καὶ δεύτερα καὶ τρίτα;
Μέγιλλος: πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
Ἀθηναῖος: λέγομεν τοίνυν ὅτι πόλιν, ὡς ἔοικεν, τὴν μέλλουσαν

σῴζεσθαί τε καὶ εὐδαιμονήσειν εἰς δύναμιν ἀνθρωπίνην δεῖ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον τιμάς τε καὶ ἀτιμίας διανέμειν ὀρθῶς. ἔστιν δὲ ὀρθῶς ἄρα τιμιώτατα μὲν καὶ πρῶτα τὰ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀγαθὰ κεῖσθαι, σωφροσύνης ὑπαρχούσης αὐτῇ, δεύτερα δὲ τὰ περὶ τὸ σῶμα καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθά, καὶ τρίτα τὰ περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ χρήματα λεγόμενα: τούτων δὲ ἂν ἐκτός τις βαίνῃ νομοθέτης ἢ πόλις, εἰς τιμὰς ἢ χρήματα προάγουσα

ἤ τι τῶν ὑστέρων εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν τιμαῖς τάττουσα, οὔθ' ὅσιον οὔτε πολιτικὸν ἂν δρῴη πρᾶγμα. εἰρήσθω ταῦτα ἢ πῶς ἡμῖν;
Μέγιλλος: πάνυ μὲν οὖν εἰρήσθω σαφῶς.
Ἀθηναῖος: ταῦτα μὲν τοίνυν ἡμᾶς ἐπὶ πλέον ἐποίησεν εἰπεῖν ἡ Περσῶν πέρι διάσκεψις τῆς πολιτείας: ἀνευρίσκομεν δὲ ἐπὶ ἔτι χείρους αὐτοὺς γεγονότας, τὴν δὲ αἰτίαν φαμέν, ὅτι τὸ ἐλεύθερον λίαν ἀφελόμενοι τοῦ δήμου, τὸ δεσποτικὸν δ' ἐπαγαγόντες μᾶλλον τοῦ προσήκοντος, τὸ φίλον ἀπώλεσαν

καὶ τὸ κοινὸν ἐν τῇ πόλει. τούτου δὲ φθαρέντος, οὔθ' ἡ τῶν ἀρχόντων βουλὴ ὑπὲρ ἀρχομένων καὶ τοῦ δήμου βουλεύεται, ἀλλ' ἕνεκα τῆς αὑτῶν ἀρχῆς, ἄν τι καὶ σμικρὸν πλέον ἑκάστοτε ἡγῶνται ἔσεσθαί σφισιν, ἀναστάτους μὲν πόλεις, ἀνάστατα δὲ ἔθνη φίλια πυρὶ καταφθείραντες, ἐχθρῶς τε καὶ ἀνηλεήτως μισοῦντες μισοῦνται: ὅταν τε εἰς χρείαν τοῦ μάχεσθαι περὶ ἑαυτῶν τοὺς δήμους ἀφικνῶνται, οὐδὲν κοινὸν ἐν αὐτοῖς αὖ μετὰ προθυμίας τοῦ ἐθέλειν κινδυνεύειν καὶ

μάχεσθαι ἀνευρίσκουσιν, ἀλλὰ κεκτημένοι μυριάδας ἀπεράντους λογισμῷ, ἀχρήστους εἰς πόλεμον πάσας κέκτηνται, καὶ καθάπερ ἐνδεεῖς ἀνθρώπων μισθούμενοι, ὑπὸ μισθωτῶν καὶ ὀθνείων ἀνθρώπων ἡγοῦνταί ποτε σωθήσεσθαι. πρὸς δὲ

τούτοις ἀμαθαίνειν ἀναγκάζονται, λέγοντες ἔργοις ὅτι λῆρος πρὸς χρυσόν τε καὶ ἄργυρόν ἐστιν ἑκάστοτε τὰ λεγόμενα τίμια καὶ καλὰ κατὰ πόλιν.
Μέγιλλος: πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
Ἀθηναῖος: τὰ μὲν δὴ περί γε Περσῶν, ὡς οὐκ ὀρθῶς τὰ νῦν διοικεῖται διὰ τὴν σφόδρα δουλείαν τε καὶ δεσποτείαν, τέλος ἐχέτω.
Μέγιλλος: πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
Ἀθηναῖος: τὰ δὲ περὶ τὴν τῆς Ἀττικῆς αὖ πολιτείας τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ὡσαύτως ἡμᾶς διεξελθεῖν χρεών, ὡς ἡ παντελὴς καὶ

ἀπὸ πασῶν ἀρχῶν ἐλευθερία τῆς μέτρον ἐχούσης ἀρχῆς ὑφ' ἑτέρων οὐ σμικρῷ χείρων: ἡμῖν γὰρ κατ' ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον, ὅτε ἡ Περσῶν ἐπίθεσις τοῖς Ἕλλησιν, ἴσως δὲ σχεδὸν ἅπασιν τοῖς τὴν Εὐρώπην οἰκοῦσιν, ἐγίγνετο, πολιτεία τε ἦν παλαιὰ καὶ ἐκ τιμημάτων ἀρχαί τινες τεττάρων, καὶ δεσπότις ἐνῆν τις αἰδώς, δι' ἣν δουλεύοντες τοῖς τότε νόμοις ζῆν ἠθέλομεν. καὶ πρὸς τούτοις δὴ τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ στόλου κατά τε γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν γενόμενον, φόβον ἄπορον ἐμβαλόν, δουλείαν

ἔτι μείζονα ἐποίησεν ἡμᾶς τοῖς τε ἄρχουσιν καὶ τοῖς νόμοις δουλεῦσαι, καὶ διὰ πάντα ταῦθ' ἡμῖν συνέπεσε πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς σφόδρα φιλία. σχεδὸν γὰρ δέκα ἔτεσιν πρὸ τῆς ἐν Σαλαμῖνι ναυμαχίας ἀφίκετο Δᾶτις Περσικὸν στόλον ἄγων, πέμψαντος Δαρείου διαρρήδην ἐπί τε Ἀθηναίους καὶ Ἐρετριᾶς, ἐξανδραποδισάμενον ἀγαγεῖν, θάνατον αὐτῷ προειπὼν μὴ πράξαντι ταῦτα. καὶ ὁ Δᾶτις τοὺς μὲν Ἐρετριᾶς ἔν τινι

βραχεῖ χρόνῳ παντάπασιν κατὰ κράτος τε εἷλεν μυριάσι συχναῖς, καί τινα λόγον εἰς τὴν ἡμετέραν πόλιν ἀφῆκεν φοβερόν, ὡς οὐδεὶς Ἐρετριῶν αὐτὸν ἀποπεφευγὼς εἴη: συνάψαντες γὰρ ἄρα τὰς χεῖρας σαγηνεύσαιεν πᾶσαν τὴν Ἐρετρικὴν οἱ στρατιῶται τοῦ Δάτιδος. ὁ δὴ λόγος, εἴτ' ἀληθὴς εἴτε καὶ ὅπῃ ἀφίκετο, τούς τε ἄλλους Ἕλληνας καὶ δὴ καὶ Ἀθηναίους ἐξέπληττεν, καὶ πρεσβευομένοις αὐτοῖς

πανταχόσε βοηθεῖν οὐδεὶς ἤθελεν πλήν γε Λακεδαιμονίων: οὗτοι δὲ ὑπό τε τοῦ πρὸς Μεσσήνην ὄντος τότε πολέμου καὶ εἰ δή τι διεκώλυεν ἄλλο αὐτούς—οὐ γὰρ ἴσμεν λεγόμενον— ὕστεροι δ' οὖν ἀφίκοντο τῆς ἐν Μαραθῶνι μάχης γενομένης μιᾷ ἡμέρᾳ. μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο παρασκευαί τε μεγάλαι λεγόμεναι καὶ ἀπειλαὶ ἐφοίτων μυρίαι παρὰ βασιλέως. προϊόντος δὲ τοῦ χρόνου, Δαρεῖος μὲν τεθνάναι ἐλέχθη, νέος δὲ καὶ σφοδρὸς ὁ ὑὸς αὐτοῦ παρειληφέναι τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ οὐδαμῶς

ἀφίστασθαι τῆς ὁρμῆς. οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι πᾶν τοῦτο ᾤοντο ἐπὶ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς παρασκευάζεσθαι διὰ τὸ Μαραθῶνι γενόμενον, καὶ ἀκούοντες Ἄθων τε διορυττόμενον καὶ Ἑλλήσποντον ζευγνύμενον καὶ τὸ τῶν νεῶν πλῆθος, ἡγήσαντο οὔτε κατὰ γῆν σφίσιν εἶναι σωτηρίαν οὔτε κατὰ θάλατταν: οὔτε γὰρ βοηθήσειν αὑτοῖς οὐδένα—μεμνημένοι ὡς οὐδ' ὅτε τὸ πρότερον ἦλθον καὶ τὰ περὶ Ἐρέτριαν διεπράξαντο, σφίσι γε οὐδεὶς τότε ἐβοήθησεν οὐδ' ἐκινδύνευσεν συμμαχόμενος: ταὐτὸν

δὴ προσεδόκων καὶ τότε γενήσεσθαι τό γε κατὰ γῆν—καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν δ' αὖ πᾶσαν ἀπορίαν ἑώρων σωτηρίας, νεῶν χιλίων καὶ ἔτι πλεόνων ἐπιφερομένων. μίαν δὴ σωτηρίαν συνενόουν, λεπτὴν μὲν καὶ ἄπορον, μόνην δ' οὖν, βλέψαντες πρὸς τὸ πρότερον γενόμενον, ὡς ἐξ ἀπόρων καὶ τότε ἐφαίνετο γενέσθαι τὸ νικῆσαι μαχομένους: ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ἐλπίδος ὀχούμενοι ταύτης ηὕρισκον καταφυγὴν αὑτοῖς εἰς αὑτοὺς μόνους

εἶναι καὶ τοὺς θεούς. ταῦτ' οὖν αὐτοῖς πάντα φιλίαν ἀλλήλων ἐνεποίει, ὁ φόβος ὁ τότε παρὼν ὅ τε ἐκ τῶν νόμων τῶν ἔμπροσθεν γεγονώς, ὃν δουλεύοντες τοῖς πρόσθεν νόμοις ἐκέκτηντο, ἣν αἰδῶ πολλάκις ἐν τοῖς ἄνω λόγοις εἴπομεν, ᾗ καὶ δουλεύειν ἔφαμεν δεῖν τοὺς μέλλοντας ἀγαθοὺς ἔσεσθαι, ἧς ὁ δειλὸς ἐλεύθερος καὶ ἄφοβος: ὃν εἰ τότε μὴ δέος ἔλαβεν, οὐκ ἄν ποτε συνελθὼν ἠμύνατο, οὐδ' ἤμυνεν ἱεροῖς τε καὶ τάφοις καὶ πατρίδι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις οἰκείοις τε ἅμα καὶ φίλοις,

ὥσπερ τότ' ἐβοήθησεν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ σμικρὰ ἂν ἐν τῷ τότε ἡμῶν ἕκαστος σκεδασθεὶς ἄλλος ἄλλοσε διεσπάρη.
Μέγιλλος: καὶ μάλα, ὦ ξένε, ὀρθῶς τε εἴρηκας καὶ σαυτῷ τε καὶ τῇ πατρίδι πρεπόντως.
Ἀθηναῖος: ἔστι ταῦτα, ὦ Μέγιλλε: πρὸς γὰρ σὲ τὰ ἐν τῷ τότε χρόνῳ γενόμενα, κοινωνὸν τῇ τῶν πατέρων γεγονότα φύσει, δίκαιον λέγειν. ἐπισκόπει μὴν καὶ σὺ καὶ Κλεινίας εἴ τι πρὸς τὴν νομοθεσίαν προσήκοντα λέγομεν: οὐ γὰρ μύθων

ἕνεκα διεξέρχομαι, οὗ λέγω δ' ἕνεκα. ὁρᾶτε γάρ: ἐπειδή τινα τρόπον ταὐτὸν ἡμῖν συμβεβήκει πάθος ὅπερ Πέρσαις, ἐκείνοις μὲν ἐπὶ πᾶσαν δουλείαν ἄγουσιν τὸν δῆμον, ἡμῖν δ' αὖ τοὐναντίον ἐπὶ πᾶσαν ἐλευθερίαν προτρέπουσι τὰ πλήθη, πῶς δὴ καὶ τί λέγωμεν τοὐντεῦθεν, οἱ προγεγονότες ἡμῖν ἔμπροσθεν λόγοι τρόπον τινὰ καλῶς εἰσιν εἰρημένοι.

Μέγιλλος: λέγεις εὖ: πειρῶ δ' ἔτι σαφέστερον ἡμῖν σημῆναι τὸ νῦν λεγόμενον.
Ἀθηναῖος: ἔσται ταῦτα. οὐκ ἦν, ὦ φίλοι, ἡμῖν ἐπὶ τῶν παλαιῶν νόμων ὁ δῆμός τινων κύριος, ἀλλὰ τρόπον τινὰ ἑκὼν ἐδούλευε τοῖς νόμοις.
Μέγιλλος: ποίοις δὴ λέγεις;
Ἀθηναῖος: τοῖς περὶ τὴν μουσικὴν πρῶτον τὴν τότε, ἵνα ἐξ ἀρχῆς διέλθωμεν τὴν τοῦ ἐλευθέρου λίαν ἐπίδοσιν βίου. διῃρημένη γὰρ δὴ τότε ἦν ἡμῖν ἡ μουσικὴ κατὰ εἴδη τε

ἑαυτῆς ἄττα καὶ σχήματα, καί τι ἦν εἶδος ᾠδῆς εὐχαὶ πρὸς θεούς, ὄνομα δὲ ὕμνοι ἐπεκαλοῦντο: καὶ τούτῳ δὴ τὸ ἐναντίον ἦν ᾠδῆς ἕτερον εἶδος—θρήνους δέ τις ἂν αὐτοὺς μάλιστα ἐκάλεσεν—καὶ παίωνες ἕτερον, καὶ ἄλλο, Διονύσου γένεσις οἶμαι, διθύραμβος λεγόμενος. νόμους τε αὐτὸ τοῦτο τοὔνομα ἐκάλουν, ᾠδὴν ὥς τινα ἑτέραν: ἐπέλεγον δὲ κιθαρῳδικούς. τούτων δὴ διατεταγμένων καὶ ἄλλων τινῶν, οὐκ ἐξῆν ἄλλο

εἰς ἄλλο καταχρῆσθαι μέλους εἶδος: τὸ δὲ κῦρος τούτων γνῶναί τε καὶ ἅμα γνόντα δικάσαι, ζημιοῦν τε αὖ τὸν μὴ πειθόμενον, οὐ σῦριγξ ἦν οὐδέ τινες ἄμουσοι βοαὶ πλήθους, καθάπερ τὰ νῦν, οὐδ' αὖ κρότοι ἐπαίνους ἀποδιδόντες, ἀλλὰ τοῖς μὲν γεγονόσι περὶ παίδευσιν δεδογμένον ἀκούειν ἦν αὐτοῖς μετὰ σιγῆς διὰ τέλους, παισὶ δὲ καὶ παιδαγωγοῖς καὶ τῷ πλείστῳ ὄχλῳ ῥάβδου κοσμούσης ἡ νουθέτησις ἐγίγνετο.

ταῦτ' οὖν οὕτω τεταγμένως ἤθελεν ἄρχεσθαι τῶν πολιτῶν τὸ πλῆθος, καὶ μὴ τολμᾶν κρίνειν διὰ θορύβου: μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα, προϊόντος τοῦ χρόνου, ἄρχοντες μὲν τῆς ἀμούσου παρανομίας ποιηταὶ ἐγίγνοντο φύσει μὲν ποιητικοί, ἀγνώμονες δὲ περὶ τὸ δίκαιον τῆς Μούσης καὶ τὸ νόμιμον, βακχεύοντες καὶ μᾶλλον τοῦ δέοντος κατεχόμενοι ὑφ' ἡδονῆς, κεραννύντες δὲ θρήνους τε ὕμνοις καὶ παίωνας διθυράμβοις, καὶ αὐλῳδίας δὴ ταῖς κιθαρῳδίαις μιμούμενοι, καὶ πάντα εἰς πάντα συνάγοντες,

μουσικῆς ἄκοντες ὑπ' ἀνοίας καταψευδόμενοι ὡς ὀρθότητα μὲν οὐκ ἔχοι οὐδ' ἡντινοῦν μουσική, ἡδονῇ δὲ τῇ τοῦ χαίροντος, εἴτε βελτίων εἴτε χείρων ἂν εἴη τις, κρίνοιτο ὀρθότατα. τοιαῦτα δὴ ποιοῦντες ποιήματα, λόγους τε ἐπιλέγοντες τοιούτους, τοῖς πολλοῖς ἐνέθεσαν παρανομίαν εἰς τὴν μουσικὴν καὶ τόλμαν ὡς ἱκανοῖς οὖσιν κρίνειν: ὅθεν δὴ τὰ

θέατρα ἐξ ἀφώνων φωνήεντ' ἐγένοντο, ὡς ἐπαΐοντα ἐν μούσαις τό τε καλὸν καὶ μή, καὶ ἀντὶ ἀριστοκρατίας ἐν αὐτῇ θεατροκρατία τις πονηρὰ γέγονεν. εἰ γὰρ δὴ καὶ δημοκρατία ἐν αὐτῇ τις μόνον ἐγένετο ἐλευθέρων ἀνδρῶν, οὐδὲν ἂν πάνυ γε δεινὸν ἦν τὸ γεγονός: νῦν δὲ ἦρξε μὲν ἡμῖν ἐκ μουσικῆς ἡ πάντων εἰς πάντα σοφίας δόξα καὶ παρανομία, συνεφέσπετο δὲ ἐλευθερία. ἄφοβοι γὰρ ἐγίγνοντο ὡς εἰδότες, ἡ δὲ ἄδεια ἀναισχυντίαν ἐνέτεκεν: τὸ γὰρ τὴν τοῦ βελτίονος

δόξαν μὴ φοβεῖσθαι διὰ θράσος, τοῦτ' αὐτό ἐστιν σχεδὸν ἡ πονηρὰ ἀναισχυντία, διὰ δή τινος ἐλευθερίας λίαν ἀποτετολμημένης.
Μέγιλλος: ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.
Ἀθηναῖος: ἐφεξῆς δὴ ταύτῃ τῇ ἐλευθερίᾳ ἡ τοῦ μὴ ἐθέλειν τοῖς ἄρχουσι δουλεύειν γίγνοιτ' ἄν, καὶ ἑπομένη ταύτῃ φεύγειν πατρὸς καὶ μητρὸς καὶ πρεσβυτέρων δουλείαν καὶ νουθέτησιν, καὶ ἐγγὺς τοῦ τέλους οὖσιν νόμων ζητεῖν μὴ ὑπηκόοις εἶναι,

πρὸς αὐτῷ δὲ ἤδη τῷ τέλει ὅρκων καὶ πίστεων καὶ τὸ παράπαν θεῶν μὴ φροντίζειν, τὴν λεγομένην παλαιὰν Τιτανικὴν φύσιν ἐπιδεικνῦσι καὶ μιμουμένοις, ἐπὶ τὰ αὐτὰ πάλιν ἐκεῖνα ἀφικομένους, χαλεπὸν αἰῶνα διάγοντας μὴ λῆξαί ποτε κακῶν. τίνος δὴ καὶ ταῦθ' ἡμῖν αὖ χάριν ἐλέχθη; δεῖν φαίνεται ἔμοιγε οἷόνπερ ἵππον τὸν λόγον ἑκάστοτε ἀναλαμβάνειν, καὶ μὴ καθάπερ ἀχάλινον κεκτημένον τὸ στόμα, βίᾳ ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου

φερόμενον, κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν ἀπό τινος ὄνου πεσεῖν, ἀλλ' ἐπανερωτᾶν τὸ νυνδὴ λεχθέν, τὸ τίνος δὴ χάριν ἕνεκα ταῦτα ἐλέχθη;
Μέγιλλος: καλῶς.
Ἀθηναῖος: ταῦτα τοίνυν εἴρηται ἐκείνων ἕνεκα.
Μέγιλλος: τίνων;
Ἀθηναῖος: ἐλέξαμεν ὡς τὸν νομοθέτην δεῖ τριῶν στοχαζόμενον νομοθετεῖν, ὅπως ἡ νομοθετουμένη πόλις ἐλευθέρα τε ἔσται καὶ φίλη ἑαυτῇ καὶ νοῦν ἕξει. ταῦτ' ἦν: ἦ γάρ;
Μέγιλλος: πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

Ἀθηναῖος: τούτων ἕνεκα δὴ πολιτείας τήν τε δεσποτικωτάτην προελόμενοι καὶ τὴν ἐλευθερικωτάτην, ἐπισκοποῦμεν νυνὶ ποτέρα τούτων ὀρθῶς πολιτεύεται: λαβόντες δὲ αὐτῶν ἑκατέρας μετριότητά τινα, τῶν μὲν τοῦ δεσπόζειν, τῶν δὲ τοῦ ἐλευθεριάσαι, κατείδομεν ὅτι τότε διαφερόντως ἐν αὐταῖς ἐγένετο εὐπραγία, ἐπὶ δὲ τὸ ἄκρον ἀγαγόντων ἑκατέρων, τῶν μὲν δουλείας, τῶν δὲ τοὐναντίου, οὐ συνήνεγκεν οὔτε τοῖς οὔτε τοῖς.

Μέγιλλος: ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.
Ἀθηναῖος: καὶ μὴν αὐτῶν γ' ἕνεκα καὶ τὸ Δωρικὸν ἐθεασάμεθα κατοικιζόμενον στρατόπεδον καὶ τὰς τοῦ Δαρδάνου ὑπωρείας τε καὶ τὴν ἐπὶ θαλάττῃ κατοίκισιν, καὶ τοὺς πρώτους δὴ τοὺς περιλιπεῖς γενομένους τῆς φθορᾶς, ἔτι δὲ τοὺς ἔμπροσθεν τούτων γενομένους ἡμῖν λόγους περί τε μουσικῆς καὶ μέθης καὶ τὰ τούτων ἔτι πρότερα. ταῦτα γὰρ πάντα εἴρηται τοῦ κατιδεῖν ἕνεκα πῶς ποτ' ἂν πόλις ἄριστα οἰκοίη, καὶ ἰδίᾳ

πῶς ἄν τις βέλτιστα τὸν αὑτοῦ βίον διαγάγοι: εἰ δὲ δή τι πεποιήκαμεν προὔργου, τίς ποτ' ἂν ἔλεγχος γίγνοιτο ἡμῖν πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς λεχθείς, ὦ Μέγιλλέ τε καὶ Κλεινία;
Κλεινίας: ἐγώ τινα, ὦ ξένε, μοι δοκῶ κατανοεῖν. ἔοικεν κατὰ τύχην τινὰ ἡμῖν τὰ τῶν λόγων τούτων πάντων ὧν διεξήλθομεν γεγονέναι: σχεδὸν γὰρ εἰς χρείαν αὐτῶν ἔγωγ' ἐλήλυθα τὰ νῦν, καὶ κατά τινα αὖ καιρὸν σύ τε παραγέγονας ἅμα καὶ

Μέγιλλος ὅδε. οὐ γὰρ ἀποκρύψομαι σφὼ τὸ νῦν ἐμοὶ συμβαῖνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς οἰωνόν τινα ποιοῦμαι. ἡ γὰρ πλείστη τῆς Κρήτης ἐπιχειρεῖ τινα ἀποικίαν ποιήσασθαι, καὶ προστάττει τοῖς Κνωσίοις ἐπιμεληθῆναι τοῦ πράγματος, ἡ δὲ τῶν Κνωσίων πόλις ἐμοί τε καὶ ἄλλοις ἐννέα: ἅμα δὲ καὶ νόμους τῶν τε αὐτόθι, εἴ τινες ἡμᾶς ἀρέσκουσιν, τίθεσθαι κελεύει, καὶ εἴ τινες ἑτέρωθεν, μηδὲν ὑπολογιζομένους τὸ ξενικὸν αὐτῶν, ἂν βελτίους φαίνωνται. νῦν οὖν ἐμοί τε καὶ

ὑμῖν ταύτην δῶμεν χάριν: ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ἐκλέξαντες, τῷ λόγῳ συστησώμεθα πόλιν, οἷον ἐξ ἀρχῆς κατοικίζοντες, καὶ ἅμα μὲν ἡμῖν οὗ ζητοῦμεν ἐπίσκεψις γενήσεται, ἅμα δὲ ἐγὼ τάχ' ἂν χρησαίμην εἰς τὴν μέλλουσαν πόλιν ταύτῃ τῇ συστάσει.
Ἀθηναῖος: οὐ πόλεμόν γε ἐπαγγέλλεις, ὦ Κλεινία: ἀλλ' εἰ μή τι Μεγίλλῳ πρόσαντες, τὰ παρ' ἐμοῦ γε ἡγοῦ σοι πάντα κατὰ νοῦν ὑπάρχειν εἰς δύναμιν.
Κλεινίας: εὖ λέγεις.
Μέγιλλος: καὶ μὴν καὶ τὰ παρ' ἐμοῦ.

Κλεινίας: κάλλιστ' εἰρήκατον. ἀτὰρ πειρώμεθα λόγῳ πρῶτον κατοικίζειν τὴν πόλιν.

IIIAthenian: So much for that, then! Now, what are we to say about the origin of government? Would not the best and easiest way of discerning it be from this standpoint?
Clinias: What standpoint?
Athenian: That from which one should always observe the progress of States as they move towards either goodness or badness.
Clinias: What point is that?
Athenian: The observation, as I suppose, of an infinitely long period of time

and of the variations therein occurring.
Clinias: Explain your meaning.
Athenian: Tell me now: do you think you could ever ascertain the space of time that has passed since cities came into existence and men lived under civic rule?
Clinias: Certainly it would be no easy task.
Athenian: But you can easily see that it is vast and immeasurable?
Clinias: That I most certainly can do.
Athenian: During this time, have not thousands upon thousands of States come into existence, and, on a similar computation, just as many perished?

And have they not in each case exhibited all kinds of constitutions over and over again? And have they not changed at one time from small to great, at another from great to small, and changed also from good to bad and from bad to good?
Clinias: Necessarily.
Athenian: Of this process of change let us discover, if we can, the cause; for this, perhaps, would show us what is the primary origin of constitutions, as well as their transformation.
Clinias: You are right; and we must all exert ourselves,—you to expound your view about them, and we to keep pace with you.

Athenian: Do you consider that there is any truth in the ancient tales?
Clinias: What tales?
Athenian: That the world of men has often been destroyed by floods, plagues, and many other things, in such a way that only a small portion of the human race has survived.
Clinias: Everyone would regard such accounts as perfectly credible.
Athenian: Come now, let us picture to ourselves one of the many catastrophes,—namely, that which occurred once upon a time through the Deluge.
Clinias: And what are we to imagine about it?

Athenian: That the men who then escaped destruction must have been mostly herdsmen of the hills, scanty embers of the human race preserved somewhere on the mountain-tops.
Clinias: Evidently.
Athenian: Moreover, men of this kind must necessarily have been unskilled in the arts generally, and especially in such contrivances as men use against one another in cities for purposes of greed and rivalry and all the other villainies which they devise one against another.

Clinias: It is certainly probable.
Athenian: Shall we assume that the cities situated in the plains and near the sea were totally destroyed at the time?
Clinias: Let us assume it.
Athenian: And shall we say that all implements were lost, and that everything in the way of important arts or inventions that they may have had,—whether concerned with politics or other sciences,— perished at that time? For, supposing that things had remained all that time ordered just as they are now, how, my good sir, could anything new have ever been invented?

Clinias: Do you mean that these things were unknown to the men of those days for thousands upon thousands of years, and that one or two thousand years ago some of them were revealed to Daedalus, some to Orpheus, some to Palamedes, musical arts to Marsyas and Olympus, lyric to Amphion, and, in short, a vast number of others to other persons—all dating, so to say, from yesterday or the day before?
Athenian: Are you aware, Clinias, that you have left out your friend who was literally a man of yesterday?
Clinias: Is it Epimenides you mean?
Athenian: Yes, I mean him. For he far outstripped everybody you had, my friend, by that invention of his of which he was the actual producer, as you Cretans say, although Hesiod had divined it and spoken of it long before.

Clinias: We do say so.
Athenian: Shall we, then, state that, at the time when the destruction took place, human affairs were in this position: there was fearful and widespread desolation over a vast tract of land; most of the animals were destroyed, and the few herds of oxen and flocks of goats that happened to survive afforded at the first but scanty sustenance

to their herdsmen?
Clinias: Yes.
Athenian: And as to the matters with which our present discourse is concerned—States and statecraft and legislation,—do we think they could have retained any memory whatsoever, broadly speaking, of such matters?
Clinias: By no means.
Athenian: So from those men, in that situation, there has sprung the whole of our present order—States and constitutions, arts and laws, with a great amount both of evil and of good?
Clinias: How do you mean?

Athenian: Do we imagine, my good Sir, that the men of that age, who were unversed in the ways of city life—many of them noble, many ignoble,—were perfect either in virtue or in vice?
Clinias: Well said! We grasp your meaning.
Athenian: As time went on and our race multiplied, all things advanced—did they not?—to the condition which now exists.
Clinias: Very true.
Athenian: But, in all probability, they advanced, not all at once, but by small degrees, during an immense space of time.

Clinias: Yes, that is most likely.
Athenian: For they all, I fancy, felt as it were still ringing in their ears a dread of going down from the highlands to the plains.
Clinias: Of course.
Athenian: And because there were so few of them round about in those days, were they not delighted to see one another, but for the fact that means of transport, whereby they might visit one another by sea or land, had practically all perished along with the arts? Hence intercourse, I imagine, was not very easy.

For iron and bronze and all the metals in the mines had been flooded and had disappeared; so that it was extremely difficult to extract fresh metal; and there was a dearth, in consequence, of felled timber. For even if there happened to be some few tools still left somewhere on the mountains, these were soon worn out, and they could not be replaced by others until men had rediscovered the art of metal-working.
Clinias: They could not.
Athenian: Now, how many generations, do we suppose, had passed before this took place?

Clinias: A great many, evidently.
Athenian: And during all this period, or even longer, all the arts that require iron and bronze and all such metals must have remained in abeyance?
Clinias: Of course.
Athenian: Moreover, civil strife and war also disappeared during that time, and that for many reasons.
Clinias: How so?
Athenian: In the first place, owing to their desolate state, they were kindly disposed and friendly towards one another; and secondly, they had no need to quarrel about food.

For they had no lack of flocks and herds (except perhaps some of them at the outset), and in that age these were what men mostly lived on: thus they were well supplied with milk and meat, and they procured further supplies of food, both excellent and plentiful, by hunting. They were also well furnished with clothing and coverlets and houses, and with vessels for cooking and other kinds; for no iron is required for the arts of moulding and weaving,

which two arts God gave to men to furnish them with all these necessaries, in order that the human race might have means of sprouting and increase whenever it should fall into such a state of distress. Consequently, they were not excessively poor, nor were they constrained by stress of poverty to quarrel one with another; and, on the other hand, since they were without gold and silver, they could never have become rich. Now a community which has no communion with either poverty or wealth is generally the one in which the noblest characters will be formed;

for in it there is no place for the growth of insolence and injustice, of rivalries and jealousies. So these men were good, both for these reasons and because of their simple-mindedness, as it is called; for, being simple-minded, when they heard things called bad or good, they took what was said for gospel-truth and believed it. For none of them had the shrewdness of the modern man to suspect a falsehood; but they accepted as true the statements made about gods and men, and ordered their lives by them. Thus they were entirely of the character we have just described.

Clinias: Certainly Megillus and I quite agree with what you say.
Athenian: And shall we not say that people living in this fashion for many generations were bound to be unskilled, as compared with either the antediluvians or the men of today, and ignorant of arts in general and especially of the arts of war as now practised by land and sea, including those warlike arts which, disguised under the names of law-suits and factions, are peculiar to cities, contrived as they are with every device of word and deed to inflict mutual hurt and injury;

and that they were also more simple and brave and temperate, and in all ways more righteous? And the cause of this state of things we have already explained.
Clinias: Quite true.
Athenian: We must bear in mind that the whole purpose of what we have said and of what we are going to say next is this,—that we may understand

what possible need of laws the men of that time had, and who their lawgiver was.
Clinias: Excellent.
Athenian: Shall we suppose that those men had no need of lawgivers, and that in those days it was not as yet usual to have such a thing? For those born in that age of the world's history did not as yet possess the art of writing, but lived by following custom and what is called patriarchal law.
Clinias: That is certainly probable.
Athenian: But this already amounts to a kind of government.
Clinias: What kind?

Athenian: Everybody, I believe, gives the name of “headship” to the government which then existed,—and it still continues to exist to-day among both Greeks and barbarians in many quarters. And, of course, Homer mentions its existence in connection with the household system of the Cyclopes, where he says— “No halls of council and no laws are theirs, But within hollow caves on mountain heights Aloft they dwell, each making his own law.”

“For wife and child; of others reck they naught.”
Clinias: This poet of yours seems to have been a man of genius. We have also read other verses of his, and they were extremely fine; though in truth we have not read much of him, since we Cretans do not indulge much in foreign poetry.
Megillus: But we Spartans do, and we regard Homer as the best of them; all the same, the mode of life he describes is always Ionian rather than Laconian.

And now he appears to be confirming your statement admirably, when in his legendary account he ascribes the primitive habits of the Cyclopes to their savagery.
Athenian: Yes, his testimony supports us; so let us take him as evidence that polities of this sort do sometimes come into existence.
Clinias: Quite right.
Athenian: Did they not originate with those people who lived scattered in separate clans or in single households, owing to the distress which followed after the catastrophes; for amongst these the eldest holds rule, owing to the fact that the rule proceeds from the parents,

by following whom they form a single flock, like a covey of birds, and live under a patriarchal government and a kingship which is of all kingships the most just?
Clinias: Most certainly.
Athenian: Next, they congregate together in greater numbers, and form larger droves; and first they turn to farming on the hill-sides,

and make ring-fences of rubble and walls to ward off wild beasts, till finally they have constructed a single large common dwelling.
Clinias: It is certainly probable that such was the course of events.
Athenian: Well, is not this also probable?
Clinias: What?
Athenian: That, while these larger settlements were growing out of the original small ones, each of the small settlements continued to retain, clan by clan, both the rule of the eldest

and also some customs derived from its isolated condition and peculiar to itself. As those who begot and reared them were different, so these customs of theirs, relating to the gods and to themselves, differed, being more orderly where their forefathers had been orderly, and more brave where they had been brave; and as thus the fathers of each clan in due course stamped upon their children and children's children their own cast of mind, these people came (as we say) into the larger community furnished each with their own peculiar laws.
Clinias: Of course.

Athenian: And no doubt each clan was well pleased with its own laws, and less well with those of its neighbors.
Clinias: True.
Athenian: Unwittingly, as it seems, we have now set foot, as it were, on the starting-point of legislation.
Clinias: We have indeed.
Athenian: The next step necessary is that these people should come together and choose out some members of each clan who, after a survey of the legal usages of all the clans, shall notify publicly to the tribal leaders and chiefs (who may be termed their “kings”) which of those usages please them best,

and shall recommend their adoption. These men will themselves be named “legislators,” and when they have established the chiefs as “magistrates,” and have framed an aristocracy, or possibly even a monarchy, from the existing plurality of “headships,” they will live under the constitution thus transformed.
Clinias: The next steps would certainly be such as you describe.
Athenian: Let us go on to describe the rise of a third form of constitution, in which are blended all kinds and varieties of constitutions, and of States as well.

Clinias: What form is that?
Athenian: The same that Homer himself mentioned next to the second, when he said that the third form arose in this way. His verses run thus— “Dardania he founded when as yet The Holy keep of Ilium was not built Upon the plain, a town for mortal folk, But still they dwelt upon the highland slopes Of many-fountained Ida.”

Indeed, these verses of his, as well as those he utters concerning the Cyclopes, are in a kind of unison with the voices of both God and Nature. For being divinely inspired in its chanting, the poetic tribe, with the aid of Graces and Muses, often grasps the truth of history.
Clinias: It certainly does.
Athenian: Now let us advance still further in the tale that now engages us; for possibly it may furnish some hint regarding the matter we have in view. Ought we not to do so?

Clinias: Most certainly.
Athenian: Ilium was founded, we say, after moving from the highlands down to a large and noble plain, on a hill of no great height which had many rivers flowing down from Ida above.
Clinias: So they say.
Athenian: And do we not suppose that this took place many ages after the Deluge?
Clinias: Many ages after, no doubt.
Athenian: At any rate they seem to have been strangely forgetful

of the catastrophe now mentioned, since they placed their city, as described, under a number of rivers descending from the mount, and relied for their safety upon hillocks of no great height.
Clinias: So it is evident that they were removed by quite a long interval from that calamity.
Athenian: By this time, too, as mankind multiplied, many other cities had been founded.
Clinias: Of course.
Athenian: And these cities also made attacks on Ilium, probably by sea too, as well as by land, since by this time all made use of the sea fearlessly.
Clinias: So it appears.

Athenian: And after a stay of ten years the Achaeans sacked Troy.
Clinias: Very true.
Athenian: Now during this period of ten years, while the siege lasted, the affairs of each of the besiegers at home suffered much owing to the seditious conduct of the young men. For when the soldiers returned to their own cities and homes,

these young people did not receive them fittingly and justly, but in such a way that there ensued a vast number of cases of death, slaughter, and exile. So they, being again driven out, migrated by sea; and because Dorieus was the man who then banded together the exiles, they got the new name of “Dorians,” instead of “Achaeans.” But as to all the events that follow this, you Lacedaemonians relate them all fully in your traditions.
Megillus: Quite true.
Athenian: And now—as it were by divine direction—we have returned once more to the very point in our discourse on laws where we made our digression, when we plunged into the subject of music and drinking-parties; and we can, so to speak, get a fresh grip upon the argument, now that it has reached this point,—the settlement of Lacedaemon,

about which you said truly that it and Crete were settled under kindred laws. From the wandering course of our argument, and our excursion through various polities and settlements, we have now gained this much: we have discerned a first, a second and a third State, all, as we suppose, succeeding one another in the settlements which took place during vast ages of time. And now there has emerged this fourth State—or “nation,” if you so prefer—which was once upon a time in course of establishment and is now established.

Now, if we can gather from all this which of these settlements was right and which wrong, and which laws keep safe what is kept safe, and which laws ruin what is mined, and what changes in what particulars would effect the happiness of the State,—then, O Megillus and Clinias, we ought to describe these things again, making a fresh start from the beginning,—unless we have some fault to find with our previous statements.
Megillus: I can assure you, Stranger, that if some god were to promise us that,

in making this second attempt to investigate legislation, we shall listen to a discourse that is no worse and no shorter than that we have just been listening to, I for one would go a long way to hear it; indeed, this would seem quite a short day, although it is, as a matter of fact, close on midsummer.
Athenian: So it seems that we must proceed with our enquiry.
Megillus: Most certainly.
Athenian: Let us, then, place ourselves in imagination at that epoch when Lacedaemon, together with Argos and Messene and the adjoining districts, had become completely subject,

Megillus, to your forefathers. They determined next, according to the tradition, to divide their host into three parts, and to establish three States,—Argos, Messene and Lacedaemon.
Megillus: Very true.
Athenian: And Temenus became King of Argos, Cresphontes of Messene, and Proclus and Eurysthenes of Lacedaemon.
Megillus: Of course.
Athenian: And all the men of that time swore that they would assist these kings

if anyone should try to wreck their kingdoms.
Megillus: Quite so.
Athenian: Is the dissolution of a kingdom, or of any government that has ever yet been dissolved, caused by any other agency than that of the rulers themselves? Or, though we made this assertion a moment ago when we happened upon this subject, have we now forgotten it?
Megillus: How could we possibly have forgotten?
Athenian: Shall we further confirm that assertion now? For we have come to the same view now, as it appears, in dealing with facts of history; so that we shall be examining it with reference not to a mere abstraction,

but to real events. Now what actually took place was this: each of the three royal houses, and the cities under their sway, swore to one another, according to the laws, binding alike on ruler and subject, which they had made,—the rulers that, as time went on and the nation advanced, they would refrain from making their rule more severe, and the subjects that, so long as the rulers kept fast to their promise, they would never upset the monarchy themselves, nor would they allow others to do so; and they swore that the kings should aid both kings and peoples

when wronged, and the peoples aid both peoples and kings. Was not that the way of it?
Megillus: It was.
Athenian: In the polities legally established—whether by the kings or others—in the three States, was not this the most important principle?
Megillus: What?
Athenian: That the other two States should always help against the third, whenever it disobeyed the laws laid down.
Megillus: Evidently.
Athenian: And surely most people insist on this,—

that the lawgivers shall enact laws of such a kind that the masses of the people accept them willingly; just as one might insist that trainers or doctors should make their treatments or cures of men's bodies pleasurable.
Megillus: Exactly so.
Athenian: But in fact one often has to be content if one can bring a body into a sound and healthy state with no great amount of pain.
Megillus: Very true.

Athenian: The men of that age possessed also another advantage which helped not a little to facilitate legislation.
Megillus: What was that?
Athenian: Their legislators, in their efforts to establish equality of property, were free from that worst of accusations which is commonly incurred in States with laws of a different kind, whenever anyone seeks to disturb the occupation of land, or to propose the abolition of debts, since he perceives that without these measures equality could never be fully secured. In such cases, if the lawgiver attempts to disturb any of these things,

everyone confronts him with the cry, “Hands off,” and they curse him for introducing redistributions of land and remissions of debts, with the result that every man is rendered powerless. But the Dorians had this further advantage, that they were free from all dread of giving offence, so that they could divide up their land without dispute; and they had no large debts of old standing.
Megillus: True
Athenian: How was it then, my good sirs, that their settlement and legislation turned out so badly?

Megillus: What do you mean? What fault have you to find with it?
Athenian: This, that whereas there were three States settled, two of the three speedily wrecked their constitution and their laws, and one only remained stable—and that was your State, Megillus.
Megillus: The question is no easy one.
Athenian: Yet surely in our consideration and enquiry into this subject, indulging in an old man's sober play with laws, we ought to proceed on our journey

painlessly, as we said when we first started out.
Megillus: Certainly, we must do as you say.
Athenian: Well, what laws would offer a better subject for investigation than the laws by which those States were regulated? Or what larger or more famous States are there about whose settling we might enquire?
Megillus: It would be hard to mention better instances than these.
Athenian: It is fairly evident that the men of that age intended this organization of theirs to serve as an adequate protection

not only for the Peloponnesus, but for the whole of Hellas as well, in case any of the barbarians should attack them just as the former dwellers around Ilium were emboldened to embark on the Trojan War through reliance on the Assyrian power as it had been in the reign of Ninus. For much of the splendor of that empire still survived and the people of that age stood in fear of its confederate power, just as we men of today dread the Great King. For since Troy was a part of the Assyrian empire, the second capture of Troy

formed a grave charge against the Greeks. It was in view of all this that the Dorian host was at that time organizes and distributed amongst three States under brother princes, the sons of Heracles ; and men thought it admirably devised, and in its equipment superior even to the host that had sailed to Troy. For men reckoned, first, that in the sons of Heracles they had better chiefs than the Pelopidae, and further,

that this army was superior in valor to the army which went to Troy, since the latter, which was Achaean, was worsted by the former, which was Dorian. Must we not suppose that it was in this way, and with this intention, that the men of that age organized themselves?
Megillus: Certainly.
Athenian: Is it not also probable that they would suppose this to be a stable arrangement, and likely to continue quite a long time,

since they had shared together many toils and dangers, and were marshalled under leaders of a single family (their princes being brothers), and since, moreover, they had consulted a number of diviners and, amongst others, the Delphian Apollo?
Megillus: That is certainly probable.
Athenian: But it seems that these great expectations speedily vanished, except only, as we said, in regard to that small fraction, your State of Laconia;

and ever since, up to the present day, this fraction has never ceased warring against the other two. For if the original intention had been realized, and if they had been in accord about their policy, it would have created a power invincible in war.
Megillus: It certainly would.
Athenian: How then, and by what means, was it destroyed? Is it not worth while to enquire by what stroke of fortune so grand a confederacy was wrecked?
Megillus: Yes for, if one passed over these examples,

one would not be likely to find elsewhere either laws or constitutions which preserve interests thus fair and great, or, on the contrary, wreck them totally.
Athenian: Thus by a piece of good luck, as it seems, we have embarked on an enquiry of some importance.
Megillus: Undoubtedly.
Athenian: Now, my dear sir, do not men in general, like ourselves at the present moment, unconsciously fancy that every fine object they set eyes on would produce marvellous results, if only a man understood the right way to make a fine use of it?

But for us to hold such an idea in regard to the matter before us would possibly be both wrong and against nature; and the same is true of all other cases where men hold such ideas.
Megillus: What is it you mean? And what shall we say is the special point of your remarks ?
Athenian: Why, my dear sir, I had a laugh at my own expense just now. For when I beheld this armament of which we are speaking, I thought it an amazingly fine thing, and that, if anyone had made a fine use of it at that time, it would have proved, as I said,

a wonderful boon to the Greeks.
Megillus: And was it not quite right and sensible of you to say this, and of us to endorse it?
Athenian: Possibly; I conceive, however, that everyone, when he beholds a thing that is large, powerful and strong, is instantly struck by the conviction that, if its possessor knew how to employ an instrument of that magnitude and quality, he could make himself happy by many wonderful achievements.

Megillus: Is not that a right conviction? Or what is your view?
Athenian: Just consider what one ought to have in view in every instance, in order to justify the bestowal of such praise. And first, with regard to the matter now under discussion,—if the men who were then marshalling the army knew how to organize it properly, how would they have achieved success? Must it not have been by consolidating it firmly and by maintaining it perpetually, so that they should be both free themselves and masters over all others whom they chose, and so that both they and their children should do

in general just what they pleased throughout the world of Greeks and barbarians alike? Are not these the reasons why they would be praised?
Megillus: Certainly.
Athenian: And in every case where a man uses the language of eulogy on seeing great wealth or eminent family distinctions or anything else of the kind, would it not be true to say that, in using it, he has this fact specially in mind,—that the possessor of such things is likely, just because of this, to realize all, or at least the most and greatest, of his desires.
Megillus: That is certainly probable.

Athenian: Come now, is there one object of desire—that now indicated by our argument—which is common to all men?
Megillus: What is that?
Athenian: The desire that, if possible, everything,—or failing that, all that is humanly possible—should happen in accordance with the demands of one's own heart.
Megillus: To he sure.
Athenian: Since this, then, is what we all wish always, alike in childhood and manhood and old age, it is for this, necessarily, that we should pray continually.
Megillus: Of course.

Athenian: Moreover, on behalf of our friends we will join in making the same prayer which they make on their own behalf.
Megillus: To be sure.
Athenian: And a son is a friend to his father, the boy to the man.
Megillus: Certainly.
Athenian: Yet the father will often pray the gods that the things which the son prays to obtain may in no wise he granted according to the son's prayers.
Megillus: Do you mean, when the son who is praying is still young and foolish?
Athenian: Yes, and also when the father, either through age or through the hot temper of youth,

being devoid of all sense of right and justice, indulges in the vehement prayers of passion (like those of Theseus against Hippolytus , when he met his luckless end), while the son, on the contrary, has a sense of justice,—in this case do you suppose that the son will echo his father's prayers?
Megillus: I grasp your meaning. You mean, as I suppose, that what a man ought to pray and press for is not that everything should follow his own desire, while his desire in no way follows his own reason; but it is the winning of wisdom that everyone of us, States and individuals alike, ought to pray for and strive after.

Athenian: Yes. And what is more, I would recall to your recollection, as well as to my own, how it was said (if you remember) at the outset that the legislator of a State, in settling his legal ordinances, must always have regard to wisdom. The injunction you gave was that the good lawgiver must frame all his laws with a view to war: I, on the other hand, maintained that, whereas by your injunction the laws would be framed with reference to one only of the four virtues, it was really essential

to look to the whole of virtue, and first and above all to pay regard to the principal virtue of the four, which is wisdom and reason and opinion, together with the love and desire that accompany them. Now the argument has come hack again to the same point, and I now repeat my former statement,—in jest, if you will, or else in earnest; I assert that prayer is a perilous practice for him who is devoid of reason, and that what he obtains is the opposite of his desires.

For I certainly expect that, as you follow the argument recently propounded, you will now discover that the cause of the ruin of those kingdoms, and of their whole design, was not cowardice or ignorance of warfare on the part either of the rulers or of those who should have been their subjects; but that what ruined them was badness of all other kinds, and especially ignorance concerning the greatest of human interests. That this was the course of events then, and is so still,

whenever such events occur, and will be so likewise in the future,—this, with your permission, I will endeavor to discover in the course of the coming argument, and to make it as clear as I can to you, my very good friends.
Clinias: Verbal compliments are in poor taste, Stranger; but by deed, if not by word, we shall pay you the highest of compliments by attending eagerly to your discourse; and that is what best shows whether compliments are spontaneous or the reverse.
Megillus: Capital, Clinias! Let us do just as you say.

Clinias: It shall be so, God willing. Only say on.
Athenian: Well then, to advance further on the track of our discourse,—we assert that it was ignorance, in its greatest form, which at that time destroyed the power we have described, and which naturally produces still the same results; and if this is so, it follows that the lawgiver must try to implant in States as much wisdom as possible, and to root out folly to the utmost of his power.
Clinias: Obviously.

Athenian: What kind of ignorance would deserve to be called the “greatest”? Consider whether you will agree with my description; I take it to be ignorance of this kind,—
Clinias: What kind?
Athenian: That which we see in the man who hates, instead of loving, what he judges to be noble and good, while he loves and cherishes what he judges to be evil and unjust. That want of accord, on the part of the feelings of pain and pleasure, with the rational judgment is, I maintain, the extreme form of ignorance, and also the “greatest” because it belongs to the main mass of the soul,—

for the part of the soul that feels pain and pleasure corresponds to the mass of the populace in the State. So whenever this part opposes what are by nature the ruling principles—knowledge, opinion, or reason,—this condition I call folly, whether it be in a State, when the masses disobey the rulers and the laws, or in an individual, when the noble elements of reason existing in the soul produce no good effect, but quite the contrary.

All these I would count as the most discordant forms of ignorance, whether in the State or the individual, and not the ignorance of the artisan,—if you grasp my meaning, Strangers.
Clinias: We do, my dear sir, and we agree with it.
Athenian: Then let it be thus resolved and declared, that no control shall be entrusted to citizens thus ignorant, but that they shall be held in reproach for their ignorance, even though they be expert calculators, and trained in all accomplishments and in everything that fosters agility

of soul, while those whose mental condition is the reverse of this shall be entitled “wise,” even if—as the saying goes—“they spell not neither do they swim” ; and to these latter, as to men of sense, the government shall be entrusted. For without harmony, my friends, how could even the smallest fraction of wisdom exist? It is impossible. But the greatest and best of harmonies would most properly be accounted the greatest wisdom; and therein he who lives rationally has a share, whereas he who is devoid thereof

will always prove to be a home-wrecker and anything rather than a saviour of the State, because of his ignorance in these matters. So let this declaration stand, as we recently said, as one of our axioms.
Clinias: Yes, let it stand.
Athenian: Our States, I presume, must have rulers and subjects.
Clinias: Of course.

Athenian: Very well then: what and how many are the agreed rights or claims in the matter of ruling and being ruled, alike in States, large or small, and in households? Is not the right of father and mother one of them? And in general would not the claim of parents to rule over offspring be a claim universally just?
Clinias: Certainly.
Athenian: And next to this, the right of the noble to rule over the ignoble; and then, following on these as a third claim, the right of older people to rule and of younger to be ruled.
Clinias: To be sure.

Athenian: The fourth right is that slaves ought to be ruled, and masters ought to rule.
Clinias: Undoubtedly.
Athenian: And the fifth is, I imagine, that the stronger should rule and the weaker be ruled.
Clinias: A truly compulsory form of rule!
Athenian: Yes, and one that is very prevalent among all kinds of creatures, being “according to nature,” as Pindar of Thebes once said. The most important right is, it would seem, the sixth, which ordains that the man without understanding should follow, and the wise man lead and rule. Nevertheless,

my most sapient Pindar, this is a thing that I, for one, would hardly assert to be against nature, but rather according thereto—the natural rule of law, without force, over willing subjects.
Clinias: A very just observation.
Athenian: Heaven's favour and good-luck mark the seventh form of rule, where we bring a man forward for a casting of lots, and declare that if he gains the lot he will most justly be ruler, but if he fails he shall take his place among the ruled.
Clinias: Very true.

Athenian: “Seest thou, O legislator,”—it is thus we might playfully address one of those who lightly start on the task of legislation— “how many are the rights pertaining to rulers, and how they are essentially opposed to one another? Herein we have now discovered a source of factions, which thou must remedy. So do thou, in the first place, join with us in enquiring how it came to pass, and owing to what transgression of those rights, that the kings of Argos and Messene brought ruin alike on themselves and on the Hellenic power,

splendid as it was at that epoch. Was it not through ignorance of that most true saying of Hesiod that 'oftimes the half is greater than the whole'?”
Clinias: Most true, indeed.
Athenian: Is it our view, then, that this causes ruin when it is found in kings rather than when found in peoples?

Clinias: Probably this is, in the main, a disease of kings, in whom luxury breeds pride of life.
Athenian: Is it not plain that what those kings strove for first was to get the better of the established laws, and that they were not in accord with one another about the pledge which they had approved both by word and by oath; and this discord—reputed to be wisdom, but really, as we affirm, the height of ignorance, owing to its grating dissonance and lack of harmony, brought the whole Greek world to ruin?
Clinias: It would seem so, certainly.

Athenian: Very well then: what precaution ought the legislator to have taken at that time in his enactments, to guard against the growth of this disorder? Verily, to perceive that now requires no great sagacity, nor is it a hard thing to declare; but the man who foresaw it in those days—if it could possibly have been foreseen—would have been a wiser man than we.
Megillus: To what are you alluding?
Athenian: If one looks at what has happened, Megillus, among you Lacedaemonians, it is easy to perceive, and after perceiving to state, what ought to have been done at that time.
Megillus: Speak still more clearly.
Athenian: The clearest statement would be this—
Megillus: What?

Athenian: If one neglects the rule of due measure, and gives things too great in power to things too small—sails to ships, food to bodies, offices of rule to souls—then everything is upset, and they run, through excess of insolence, some to bodily disorders, others to that offspring of insolence, injustice. What, then, is our conclusion? Is it not this? There does not exist, my friends, a mortal soul whose nature, when young and irresponsible, will ever be able to stand being in the highest ruling position upon earth without getting surfeited in mind with that greatest of disorders,

folly, and earning the detestation of its nearest friends; and when this occurs, it speedily ruins the soul itself and annihilates the whole of its power. To guard against this, by perceiving the due measure, is the task of the great lawgiver. So the most duly reasonable conjecture we can now frame as to what took place at that epoch appears to be this—
Megillus: What?
Athenian: To begin with, there was a god watching over you; and he, foreseeing the future, restricted within due bounds the royal power by making

your kingly line no longer single but twofold. In the next place, some man, in whom human nature was blended with power divine, observing your government to be still swollen with fever, blended the self-willed force

of the royal strain with the temperate potency of age, by making the power of the eight-and-twenty elders of equal weight with that of the kings in the greatest matters. Then your “third saviour,” seeing your government still fretting and fuming, curbed it, as one may say, by the power of the ephors, which was not far removed from government by lot. Thus, in your case, according to this account, owing to its being blended of the right elements and possessed of due measure, the kingship not only survived itself but ensured the survival of all else.

For if the matter had lain with Temenus and Cresphontes and the lawgivers of their day—whosoever those lawgivers really were,—even the portion of Aristodemus could never have survived, for they were not fully expert in the art of legislation; otherwise they could hardly have deemed it sufficient to moderate by means of sworn pledges a youthful soul endowed with power such as might develop into a tyranny; but now God has shown of what kind the government ought to have been then, and ought to be now, if it is to endure. That we should understand this,

after the occurrence, is—as I said before —no great mark of sagacity, since it is by no means difficult to draw an inference from an example in the past; but if, at the time, there had been anyone who foresaw the result and was able to moderate the ruling powers and unify them,—such a man would have preserved all the grand designs then formed, and no Persian or other armament would ever have set out against Greece, or held us in contempt as a people of small account.
Clinias: True.

Athenian: The way they repulsed the Persians, Clinias, was disgraceful. But when I say “disgraceful,” I do not imply that they did not win fine victories both by land and sea in those victorious campaigns: what I call “disgraceful” is this,—that, in the first place, one only of those three States defended Greece, while the other two were so basely corrupt that one of them actually prevented Lacedaemon from assisting Greece by warring against her with all its might, and Argos, the other,—which stood first of the three in the days of the Dorian settlement—

when summoned to help against the barbarian, paid no heed and gave no help. Many are the discreditable charges one would have to bring against Greece in relating the events of that war; indeed, it would be wrong to say that Greece defended herself, for had not the bondage that threatened her been warded off by the concerted policy of the Athenians

and Lacedaemonians, practically all the Greek races would have been confused together by now, and barbarians confused with Greeks and Greeks with barbarians,—just as the races under the Persian empire today are either scattered abroad or jumbled together and live in a miserable plight. Such, O Megillus and Clinias, are the charges we have to make against the so-called statesmen and lawgivers, both of the past and of the present, in order that, by investigating their causes, we may discover

what different course ought to have been pursued; just as, in the case before us, we called it a blunder to establish by law a government that is great or unblended, our idea being that a State ought to be free and wise and in friendship with itself, and that the lawgiver should legislate with a view to this. Nor let it surprise us that, while we have often already proposed ends which the legislator should, as we say, aim at in his legislation,

the various ends thus proposed are apparently different. One needs to reflect that wisdom and friendship, when stated to be the aim in view, are not really different aims, but identical and, if we meet with many other such terms, let not this fact disturb us.
Clinias: We shall endeavor to bear this in mind as we traverse the arguments again. But for the moment, as regards friendship, wisdom and freedom,—tell us,

what was it you intended to say that the lawgiver ought to aim at?
Athenian: Listen. There are two mother-forms of constitution, so to call them, from which one may truly say all the rest are derived. Of these the one is properly termed monarchy, the other democracy, the extreme case of the former being the Persian polity, and of the latter the Athenian; the rest are practically all, as I said, modifications of these two. Now it is essential for a polity to partake of both these two forms, if it is to have freedom and friendliness combined with wisdom.

And that is what our argument intends to enjoin, when it declares that a State which does not partake of these can never be rightly constituted.
Clinias: It could not.
Athenian: Since the one embraced monarchy and the other freedom, unmixed and in excess, neither of them has either in due measure: your Laconian and Cretan States are better in this respect, as were the Athenian and Persian in old times—

in contrast to their present condition. Shall we expound the reasons for this?
Clinias: By all means—that is if we mean to complete the task we have set ourselves.
Athenian: Let us attend then. When the Persians, under Cyrus, maintained the due balance between slavery and freedom, they became, first of all, free themselves, and, after that, masters of many others. For when the rulers gave a share of freedom to their subjects and advanced them to a position of equality, the soldiers were more friendly

towards their officers and showed their devotion in times of danger; and if there was any wise man amongst them, able to give counsel, since the king was not jealous but allowed free speech and respected those who could help at all by their counsel,—such a man had the opportunity of contributing to the common stock the fruit of his wisdom. Consequently, at that time all their affairs made progress, owing to their freedom, friendliness and mutual interchange of reason.
Clinias: Probably that is pretty much the way in which the matters you speak of took place.

Athenian: How came it, then, that they were ruined in Cambyses' reign, and nearly restored again under Darius? Shall I use a kind of divination to picture this?
Clinias: Yes that certainly will help us to gain a view of the object of our search.
Athenian: What I now divine regarding Cyrus is this,—that, although otherwise a good and patriotic commander, he was entirely without a right education, and had paid no attention to household management.
Clinias: What makes us say this?

Athenian: Probably he spent all his life from boyhood in soldiering, and entrusted his children to the women folk to rear up; and they brought them up from earliest childhood as though they had already attained to Heaven's favour and felicity, and were lacking in no celestial gift; and so by treating them as the special favorites of Heaven, and forbidding anyone to oppose them, in anything, and compelling everyone to praise their every word and deed, they reared them up into what they were.
Clinias: A fine rearing, I should say!

Athenian: Say rather, a womanish rearing by royal women lately grown rich, who, while the men were absent, detained by many dangers and wars, reared up the children.
Clinias: That sounds reasonable.
Athenian: And their father, while gaining flocks and sheep and plenty of herds, both of men and of many other chattels,

yet knew not that the children to whom he should bequeath them were without training in their father's craft, which was a hard one, fit to turn out shepherds of great strength, able to camp out in the open and to keep watch and, if need be, to go campaigning. He overlooked the fact that his sons were trained by women and eunuchs and that the indulgence shown them as “Heaven's darlings” had ruined their training, whereby they became

such as they were likely to become when reared with a rearing that “spared the rod.” So when, at the death of Cyrus, his sons took over the kingdom, over-pampered and undisciplined as they were, first, the one killed the other, through annoyance at his being put on an equality with himself, and presently, being mad with drink and debauchery, he lost his own throne at the hands of the Medes, under the man then called the Eunuch, who despised the stupidity of Cambyses.
Clinias: That, certainly, is the story, and probably it is near to

the truth.
Athenian: Further, the story tells how the kingdom was restored to the Persians through Darius and the Seven.
Clinias: It does.
Athenian: Let us follow the story and see how things went. Darius was not a king's son, nor was he reared luxuriously. When he came and seized the kingdom, with his six companions, he divided it into seven parts, of which some small vestiges remain even to this day;

and he thought good to manage it by enacting laws into which he introduced some measure of political equality, and also incorporated in the law regulations about the tribute-money which Cyrus had promised the Persians, whereby he secured friendliness and fellowship amongst all classes of the Persians, and won over the populace by money and gifts; and because of this, the devotion of his armies won for him as much more land as Cyrus had originally bequeathed. After Darius came Xerxes, and he again was brought up with the luxurious rearing of a royal house: “O Darius”—for it is thus one may rightly address the father—“how is it that you have ignored the blunder of Cyrus,

and have reared up Xerxes in just the same habits of life in which Cyrus reared Cambyses?” And Xerxes, being the product of the same training, ended by repeating almost exactly the misfortunes of Cambyses. Since then there has hardly ever been a single Persian king who was really, as well as nominally, “Great.” And, as our argument asserts, the cause of this does not lie in luck,

but in the evil life which is usually lived by the sons of excessively rich monarchs; for such an upbringing can never produce either boy or man or greybeard of surpassing goodness. To this, we say, the lawgiver must give heed,—as must we ourselves on the present occasion. It is proper, however, my Lacedaemonian friends, to give your State credit for this at least,—that you assign no different honor or training whatsoever to poverty or wealth, to the commoner or the king,

beyond what your original oracle declared at the bidding of some god. Nor indeed is it right that pre-eminent honors in a State should be conferred on a man because he is specially wealthy, any more than it is right to confer them because he is swift or comely or strong without any virtue, or with a virtue devoid of temperance.
Megillus: What do you mean by that, Stranger?
Athenian: Courage is, presumably, one part of virtue.
Megillus: Certainly.
Athenian: Now that you have heard the argument, judge for yourself whether you would welcome as housemate or neighbor a man who is extremely courageous, but licentious rather than temperate.

Megillus: Don't suggest such a thing!
Athenian: Well then,—a man wise in arts and crafts, but unjust.
Megillus: Certainly not.
Athenian: But justice, surely, is not bred apart from temperance.
Megillus: Impossible.
Athenian: Nor is he whom we recently proposed as our type of wisdom,—the man who has his feelings of pleasure and pain in accord with the dictates of right reason and obedient thereto.
Megillus: No, indeed.

Athenian: Here is a further point we must consider, in order to judge about the conferment of honors in States, when they are right and when wrong.
Megillus: What point?
Athenian: If temperance existed alone in a man's soul, divorced from all the rest of virtue, would it justly be held in honor or the reverse?
Megillus: I cannot tell what reply to make.
Athenian: Yet, in truth, you have made a reply, and a reasonable one. For if you had declared for either of the alternatives in my question, you would have said what is, to my mind, quite out of tune.
Megillus: So it has turned out to be all right.
Athenian: Very good. Accordingly, the additional element in objects deserving of honor

or dishonor will be one that demands not speech so much as a kind of speechless silence.
Megillus: I suppose you mean temperance.
Athenian: Yes. And of the rest, that which, with the addition of temperance, benefits us most would best deserve to be held in the highest honor, and the second in degree of benefit put second in order of honor; and so with each of the others in succession—to each it will be proper to assign the honor due to its rank.

Megillus: Just so.
Athenian: Well then, shall we not declare that the distribution of these things is the lawgiver's task?
Megillus: Certainly.
Athenian: Is it your wish that we should hand over the whole distribution to him, to deal with every case and all the details, while we—as legal enthusiasts ourselves also—confine ourselves to making a threefold division, and endeavor to distinguish what comes first in importance, and what second and third?
Megillus: By all means.
Athenian: We declare, then, that a State which is to endure,

and to be as happy as it is possible for man to be, must of necessity dispense honors rightly. And the right way is this: it shall be laid down that the goods of the soul are highest in honor and come first, provided that the soul possesses temperance; second come the good and fair things of the body; and third the so-called goods of substance and property. And if any law-giver or State transgresses these rules, either by promoting wealth to honors, or by raising one of the lower goods

to a higher rank by means of honors, he will be guilty of a breach both of religion and of statesmanship. Shall this be our declaration, or what?
Megillus: By all means let us declare this plainly.
Athenian: It was our investigation of the polity of the Persians that caused us to discuss these matters at greater length. We find that they grew still worse, the reason being, as we say, that by robbing the commons unduly of their liberty and introducing despotism in excess, they destroyed

in the State the bonds of friendliness and fellowship. And when these are destroyed, the policy of the rulers no longer consults for the good of the subjects and the commons, but solely for the maintenance of their own power; if they think that it will profit them in the least degree, they are ready at any time to overturn States and to overturn and burn up friendly nations; and thus they both hate and are hated with a fierce and ruthless hatred. And when they come to need the commons, to fight in their support, they find in them no patriotism

or readiness to endanger their lives in battle; so that, although they possess countless myriads of men, they are all useless for war, and they hire soldiers from abroad as though they were short of men, and imagine that their safety will be secured by hirelings and aliens. And besides all this,

they inevitably display their ignorance, inasmuch as by their acts they declare that the things reputed to be honorable and noble in a State are never anything but dross compared to silver and gold.
Megillus: Very true.
Athenian: So let this be the conclusion of our account of the Persian empire, and how its present evil administration is due to excess of slavery and of despotism.
Megillus: By all means.
Athenian: We ought to examine next, in like manner, the Attic polity, and show how complete liberty, unfettered by any authority, is vastly inferior to a moderate form of government under elected magistrates.

At the time when the Persians made their onslaught upon the Greeks—and indeed one might say on nearly all the nations of Europe—we Athenians had an ancient constitution, and magistrates based on a fourfold grading; and we had Reverence, which acted as a kind of queen, causing us to live as the willing slaves of the existing laws. Moreover, the vastness of the Persian armament that threatened us both by sea and land, by the desperate fear it inspired, bound us still more closely in the bonds of slavery

to our rulers and our laws; and because of all this, our mutual friendliness and patriotism was greatly intensified. It was just about ten years before the seafight at Salamis that the Persian force arrived under Datis, whom Darius had despatched expressly against the Athenians and Eretrians, with orders to bring them back in chains, and with the warning that death would be the penalty of failure. So within a very short time

Datis, with his many myriads, captured by force the whole of the Eretrians; and to Athens he sent on an alarming account of how not a man of the Eretrians had escaped him: the soldiers of Datis had joined hands and swept the whole of Eretria clean as with a draw-net. This account—whether true, or whatever its origin—struck terror into the Greeks generally, and especially the Athenians; but when they sent out embassies in every direction to seek aid, all refused,

except the Lacedaemonians; and they were hindered by the war they were then waging against Messene, and possibly by other obstacles, about which we have no information, with the result that they arrived too late by one single day for the battle which took place at Marathon. After this, endless threats and stories of huge preparations kept arriving from the Persian king. Then, as time went on, news came that Darius was dead, and that his son, who had succeeded to the throne, was a young hothead, and still keen on the projected expedition.

The Athenians imagined that all these preparations were aimed against them because of the affair at Marathon; and when they heard of how the canal had been made through Athos, and the bridge thrown over the Hellespont, and were told of the vast number of vessels in the Persian flotilla, then they felt that there was no salvation for them by land, nor yet by sea. By land they had no hopes that anyone would come to their aid; for they remembered how, on the first arrival of the Persians and their subjugation of Eretria, nobody helped them or

ventured to join in the fight with them; and so they expected that the same thing would happen again on this occasion. By sea, too, they saw no hope of safety, with more than a thousand war-ships bearing down against them. One solitary hope of safety did they perceive—a slight one, it is true, and a desperate, yet the only hope—and it they derived from the events of the past, when victory in battle appeared to spring out of a desperate situation; and buoyed up by this hope, they discovered that they must rely for refuge on themselves only and on the gods.

So all this created in them a state of friendliness one towards another—both the fear which then possessed them, and that begotten of the past, which they had acquired by their subjection to the former laws—the fear to which, in our previous discussions, we have often given the name of “reverence,” saying that a man must be subject to this if he is to be good (though the coward is unfettered and unaffrighted by it). Unless this fear had then seized upon our people, they would never have united in self-defence, nor would they have defended their temples and tombs and fatherland, and their relatives and friends as well,

in the way in which they then came to the rescue; but we would all have been broken up at that time and dispersed one by one in all directions.
Megillus: What you say, Stranger, is perfectly true, and worthy of your country as well as of yourself.
Athenian: That is so, Megillus: it is proper to mention the events of that period to you, since you share in the native character of your ancestors. But both you and Clinias must now consider whether what we are saying is

at all pertinent to our law-making; for my narrative is not related for its own sake, but for the sake of the law-making I speak of. Just reflect: seeing that we Athenians suffered practically the same fate as the Persians—they through reducing their people to the extreme of slavery, we, on the contrary, by urging on our populace to the extreme of liberty—what are we to say was the sequel, if our earlier statements have been at all nearly correct?

Megillus: Well said! Try, however, to make your meaning still more clear to us.
Athenian: I will. Under the old laws, my friends, our commons had no control over anything, but were, so to say, voluntary slaves to the laws.
Megillus: What laws do you mean?
Athenian: Those dealing with the music of that age, in the first place,—to describe from its commencement how the life of excessive liberty grew up. Among us, at that time, music was divided into various classes and styles:

one class of song was that of prayers to the gods, which bore the name of “hymns”; contrasted with this was another class, best called “dirges”; “paeans” formed another; and yet another was the “dithyramb,” named, I fancy, after Dionysus. “Nomes” also were so called as being a distinct class of song; and these were further described as “citharoedic nomes.” So these and other kinds being classified and fixed, it was forbidden to set one kind of words to a different class of tune.

The authority whose duty it was to know these regulations, and, when known, to apply them in its judgments and to penalize the disobedient, was not a pipe nor, as now, the mob's unmusical shoutings, nor yet the clappings which mark applause: in place of this, it was a rule made by those in control of education that they themselves should listen throughout in silence, while the children and their ushers and the general crowd were kept in order by the discipline of the rod.

In the matter of music the populace willingly submitted to orderly control and abstained from outrageously judging by clamor; but later on, with the progress of time, there arose as leaders of unmusical illegality poets who, though by nature poetical, were ignorant of what was just and lawful in music; and they, being frenzied and unduly possessed by a spirit of pleasure, mixed dirges with hymns and paeans with dithyrambs, and imitated flute-tunes with harp-tunes, and blended every kind of music with every other;

and thus, through their folly, they unwittingly bore false witness against music, as a thing without any standard of correctness, of which the best criterion is the pleasure of the auditor, be he a good man or a bad. By compositions of such a character, set to similar words, they bred in the populace a spirit of lawlessness in regard to music, and the effrontery of supposing themselves capable of passing judgment on it. Hence the theater-goers became noisy

instead of silent, as though they knew the difference between good and bad music, and in place of an aristocracy in music there sprang up a kind of base theatrocracy. For if in music, and music only, there had arisen a democracy of free men, such a result would not have been so very alarming; but as it was, the universal conceit of universal wisdom and the contempt for law originated in the music, and on the heels of these came liberty. For, thinking themselves knowing, men became fearless; and audacity begat effrontery. For to be fearless

of the opinion of a better man, owing to self-confidence, is nothing else than base effrontery; and it is brought about by a liberty that is audacious to excess.
Megillus: Most true.
Athenian: Next after this form of liberty would come that which refuses to be subject to the rulers; and, following on that, the shirking of submission to one's parents and elders and their admonitions; then, as the penultimate stage, comes the effort to disregard the laws; while the last stage of all is to lose all respect for oaths or pledges or divinities,—wherein men display and reproduce the character of the Titans of story,

who are said to have reverted to their original state, dragging out a painful existence with never any rest from woe. What, again, is our object in saying all this? Evidently, I must, every time, rein in my discourse, like a horse, and not let it run away with me as though it had no bridle

in its mouth, and so “get a toss off the donkey” (as the saying goes): consequently, I must once more repeat my question, and ask—“With what object has all this been said?”
Megillus: Very good.
Athenian: What has now been said bears on the objects previously stated.
Megillus: What were they?
Athenian: We said that the lawgiver must aim, in his legislation, at three objectives—to make the State he is legislating for free, and at unity with itself, and possessed of sense. That was so, was it not?
Megillus: Certainly.

Athenian: With these objects in view, we selected the most despotic of polities and the most absolutely free, and are now enquiring which of these is rightly constituted. When we took a moderate example of each—of despotic rule on the one hand, and liberty on the other,—we observed that there they enjoyed prosperity in the highest degree but when they advanced, the one to the extreme of slavery, the other to the extreme of liberty, then there was no gain to either the one or the other.

Megillus: Most true.
Athenian: With the same objects in view we surveyed, also, the settling of the Doric host and the homes of Dardanus at the foot of the hills and the colony by the sea and the first men who survived the Flood, together with our previous discourses concerning music and revelry, as well as all that preceded these. The object of all these discourses was to discover how best

a State might be managed, and how best the individual citizen might pass his life. But as to the value of our conclusions, what test can we apply in conversing among ourselves, O Megillus and Clinias?
Clinias: I think, Stranger, that I can perceive one. It is a piece of good luck for me that we have dealt with all these matters in our discourse. For I myself have now come nearly to the point when I shall need them, and my meeting with you and Megillus here was quite opportune. I will make no secret to you of what has befallen me;

nay, more, I count it to be a sign from Heaven. The most part of Crete is undertaking to found a colony, and it has given charge of the undertaking to the Cnosians, and the city of Cnosus has entrusted it to me and nine others. We are bidden also to frame laws, choosing such as we please either from our own local laws or from those of other countries, taking no exception to their alien character, provided only that they seem superior. Let us, then, grant this favour to me, and yourselves also;

let us select from the statements we have made, and build up by arguments the framework of a State, as though we were erecting it from the foundation. In this way we shall be at once investigating our theme, and possibly I may also make use of our framework for the State that is to be formed.
Athenian: Your proclamation, Clinias, is certainly not a proclamation of war! So, if Megillus has no objection, you may count on me to do all I can to gratify your wish.
Clinias: It is good to hear that.
Megillus: And you can count on me too.

Clinias: Splendid of you both! But, in the first place, let us try to found the State by word.